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Abstract
This thesis explores Niger as a transit country for Nigerian and other West African migrants and
is informed by the border regime theory. This theory explains migration as a struggle on
inclusion and exclusion among different actors within and across a border. These actors include
migrants, states and their agencies, inter-governmental & non-governmental organizations, and
individuals. This thesis uses qualitative research and relies on ethnographic research, semistructured interviews and focus group discussions. The thesis asks two research questions: (1)
are the EU migration control agreements in the Sahel region and the Nigerien government
migration law of 2015 strong enough to stop transiting migration in Niger. (2) What are the
implications of the securitized migration policies on the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement
of Persons, economic well-being, and security in Niger. This thesis suggests two hypotheses:
first, state border and migration control policy cannot stop or eradicate transiting migration
because there is a strong connection between smuggling and trafficking networks and the
overall functioning of Niger as a transit country. Second, securitization of migration is a threat
to the ECOWAS Protocol of Free Movement of Persons of West African migrants and poses a
danger to economic survival and security in Niger. The research findings confirm the thesis
hypotheses. It also reveals the vulnerability of independent female migration in the Sahel region
to smuggling, trafficking, and sex trade. In addition, it exposes the collaboration of state and
non-state actors in undermining migration law.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Introduction
For centuries, Niger has been a crossroads for trans-Saharan migration caravan routes
thanks to its geographic location. These routes link Africa to the Mediterranean region
(Castle et al, 2013). Niger is also a landlocked country that shares its borders with
Nigeria, Benin, Chad, Burkina Faso and Mali in West Africa, as well as Algeria and Libya
in North Africa. Moreover, West African or ECOWAS1 states (including Nigeria and
Niger) have historically been transit, receiving, and sending countries for migrants,
resulting in regular and common migration flows among these states (Xchange, 2019a).
Conservative estimates suggested that approximately 100,000 migrants have passed
through Niger each year since 2000; while about 330,000 migrants transited through the
country in 2017 (Molenaar, 2017). In addition, three-quarters of all African migrants
arriving by boat to Italy in recent years transited through Niger (Xchange, 2019a;
Howden & Zandonini, 2018). Furthermore, according to the IOM Flow Monitoring
Points (FMPs), an estimated 256,262 migrants transited through Niger to North Africa,
with 93% heading to Libya and 7% to Algeria between February 1, and August 15, 2016
(Jerome et al 2018; Hall 2017; DIIS Policy Brief 2017). This data confirms the assertion
that Niger’s territory is commonly used as a transiting route by sub-Saharan migrants to
North Africa and elsewhere (Styllanus 2017)

1
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States/countries in West Africa region formed ECOWAS 1975. (Adepoju 2000: 3-28).

The diminished tourism industry in Niger due to political tension caused by the Tuareg
rebellions in the late 2000s, along with the reported kidnapping cases of foreign workers
in the country, significantly reduced the income of many Nigeriens whose livelihood
relied on the industry (Xchange, 2019a; Bagnetto, 2012). Consequently, the dwindling
tourism business forced some Nigeriens who were formerly employed in the tourism
sector and possessed knowledge of the desert region to start smuggling mostly West
African migrants from Agadez to Libya (Xchange, 2019a). In addition, as part of a socioeconomic integration program, the Nigerien government encouraged former Tuareg
rebels to resort to transporting migrants for a living instead of engaging in drug
smuggling after peace talks in the 1990s and 2000s (Akkerman 2018). To bring this
program to actuality, the Nigerien government provided ex-rebels with papiers de
courtage. These papers granted them legal permission to transport migrants from
Agadez to Algeria (Xchange, 2019a). Transiting migration, particularly in Agadez,
benefitted local economic sectors that sustained such migration patterns. These sectors
notably include transportation, lodging, food vendors and money transfer (Hall 2017).
This highlights the complex nature of transit migration activities in Niger. It involves
different actors and is connected to economic, security and political factors.
However, in 2015, the Nigerien government implemented a migration law criminalizing
the trafficking and smuggling of migrants (Hall 2017). This was in reaction to the widely
circulated news of the discovery of 92 dead bodies (largely women and children) in the
9

Algerian desert after being-abandoned by smugglers (Xchange 2019a). In addition, this
law was passed due to concerted pressure on the Nigerien government by the European
Union (EU) (Molenaar, 2017). The law effectively made it illegal for non-Nigerien
nationals to travel north of Agadez and cemented Niger’s position as the southern
externalized border of Europe. (Howden & Zandonini, 2018; Xchange, 2019a).
It is important to reemphasize that transporting migrants from Niger to North Africa
was permitted before the implementation of the migration law in 2015. However, it
became an offence to take part in such activities thereafter. The implementation of the
law, therefore, had far-reaching consequences on the local economy. It majorly affected
the livelihoods of Nigeriens that made their living from offering services to migrants.
This includes former Tuareg rebels who were previously permitted by the Nigerien
government to transport migrants. It also affected the entire Agadez region as its
economy relied on the income generated by providing services to migrants transiting
through the area (Akkerman 2018: 52). However, despite the law banning trafficking and
smuggling of migrants in Niger, some individuals persisted in the act after 2015. These
include smugglers who deploy different coping tactics to avoid being caught by security
forces. The coping tactics adopted are bribing of police officers at checkpoints,
relocation of the migration route, and using the services of the informants (Molenaar,
2017; Xchange, 2019a). I will later comment on this in the literature review section of
the thesis.
10

Nigerian migrants who are transiting through Niger to North Africa, Europe, and other
places are motivated by several factors. First, the economic downturn experienced in
Nigeria following the introduction of the World Bank policy of the Structural Adjustment
Program (SAP) by the Nigerian government in June 1986 forced many to migrate
elsewhere (Afolayan et al, 2009). Other factors include the long reign of military
dictatorship which committed human right violations and mismanaged the economy, as
well as environmental/ecological issues (for instance, oil spillage in the Niger delta area
and desertification along the Chad basin), and, in recent years, the Boko-Haram crisis
(Comolli, 2017: Ikwuyatum, 2012; Adepoju, 2011; Afolayan, 1998). In addition, the
ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons within the region also boosted the
number of Nigerian migrants transiting through Niger, particularly to Libya in the early
1990’s. This was due to the thriving oil economy in Libya and the pan-Africanism policy
of Gaddafi at the time (Barrios, 2015; Adepoju, 2000; Hein de Haas, 2006; Adepoju,
2004). This is further elaborated in the literature review section of this thesis.
Similarly, other West African states also experienced socioeconomic and political
upheavals that forced some of their citizens to migrate out of their countries
(Ikwuyatum, 2016, 2012; Olsen, 2011; Afolayan et al, 2009). For instance, Ikwuyatum
(2012) notes that nationals of West Africa countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leon, Cote
d’Ivore, etc, experienced different waves and patterns of migration flows into diversified
destinations due to civil war, political instability, and the economic crisis that occurred in
11

these countries in the late 1980s and 2000s. In addition, West African states also
experienced labor, commercial and professional migration within the region and to
various destinations and countries in Europe, South East Asia, the Arab-Gulf region and
North America (See Figure 1) (Ikwuyatum, 2016, 2012; Olsen, 2011; Afolayan et al, 2009)
Fig 1: Intra-regional & international migration in West Africa

Source: Olsen 2011:6

The EU border externalization policies have also has a great impact on transit and
irregular migration in the Sahel region. The EU’s attention was attracted to the North
and Sahel regions of Africa due to concern over security of the EU’s borders, prevention
of the alleged influx of migrants/refugees, and ensuring migrants’ safety (Reidy, 2018:
Düvell, 2008). Therefore, the EU partnered with Niger, Morocco, Algeria, and Libya
12

toward preventing irregular migration, terrorism, and cross border banditry through its
various policies, agreements, and plans. These included the European Neighborhood
Policy (ENP) 2004; the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Euro-Med/Barcelona Process)
2005; the European Agenda on Migration 2015; the Valletta Agreement 2015; Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)
partnership; and FRONTEX (Abebe, 2019; Mason, 2018; Akkerman, 2018; Molenaar,
2017; Cardwell, 2011; Düvell, 2008; Collyer, 2007).
A recent EU border externalization intervention in Niger is the Sahel Regional Action
Plan of 2015-2020. Among the programs developed by the EU under the action plan is
EUCAP Sahel Niger. This program focuses on border management, curbing irregular
migration, and capacity training for Nigerien security and border personnel (Akkerman,
2018; Molenaar, 2017). The Nigerien government benefits financially from the EUCAP
Sahel Niger and other EU intervention programs in the Sahel region. For instance, the
EUCAP Sahel Niger budget was 18.4 million euros in 2016 (Hall, 2017). The EU also
partnered with Niger through the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUFA). As indicated
in Table 1 below, over 50 million Euros were provided for Niger through EUFA project in
2016 (Akkerman. 2018; Hall, 2017). The purpose was to use the funds for the prevention
of irregular migration, enhanced security in Niger, and to maintain the EU border
externalization in the Sahel region. Individual European countries also deployed their
military personnel for migration control in the region. For instance, the Italian parliament
13

approved the deployment of 470 troops to Niger, 400 to Libya and 60 to Tunisia in
February 2018. French President, Emanuel Macron, also proposed to increase the
number of French soldiers in Niger for border control by December 2017 (Akkerman,
2018). Furthermore, French and Spanish police officers work together with the Nigerien
police personnel to trail and arrest smugglers (Zandonini, 2019).
Table 1: EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa- ‘migration management’ projects in Niger.
Project
Funding
Setting up a joint investigation team to combat irregular immigration, human
€6
trafficking and people smuggling
million
Support for justice and security in Niger to fight organized crime, smuggling and
€30
human trafficking (AJUSEN)
million
Response mechanism and resources for migrants (MRRM)
€7
million
Programme de renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et €15
le retour durable au Niger (Sustainable Return from Niger- SURENI)
million
Source: (Akkerman, 2018:51)

1.2 Justification of the Thesis
The dynamics of transit migration in the sub-Saharan African countries have not been
fully researched and understood. This creates a wide gap in the academic literature,
bearing in mind the increasing academic interest about migrants transiting through
North African countries. Consequently, conducting research about Nigerian migrants
transiting through Niger to North Africa, Europe or other places fills an important gap in
the academic literature in Migration and Refugee Studies. This thesis, therefore, adds to
the understudied literature of transiting migration in the Sahel region of Africa. It
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examines the activities of actors involved in transit migration and their impacts on the
migrants and transit territory.

1.3 Aim and Objectives
The overall aim of the thesis is to explore the dynamics of Nigerian migrants transiting
through Niger as they migrate to North Africa or elsewhere. The objectives are to:
◼ Explore the experiences of the Nigerian migrants in the context of transiting
migration.
◼ Explore in-depth the situation in Niger as a transit country.
◼ Investigate the role and action of the migrants, migrants’ network-links, the
government, and regional and international bodies in the dynamics of transiting
migration.
◼ Understand the impact of the restrictive migration policies and increased
securitization of migration on the feminization of migration, security, and
economic activities in the transit territory.

1.4 Research Questions
To better explore the aim and objectives of the thesis, two research questions were
developed and researched. The questions were used as a guide to understanding the
circumstances surrounding the mobility of Nigerian migrants transiting through Niger
in the context of the migration policies they move under. The questions are:
(1) Are the EU migration control agreements in the Sahel region and the Nigerien
government migration law of 2015 strong enough to stop transiting migration in Niger?
15

(2) What are the implications of the securitized migration policies on the ECOWAS
Protocol of Free Movement, economic well-being and security in Niger?

1.5 Hypotheses
To answer these two research questions, the thesis suggests two hypotheses, namely:
(1) State border and migration control policy cannot stop or eradicate transiting
migration because there is a strong connection between smuggling and
trafficking networks and the functioning of Niger as a transit country.
(2) Second, securitization of migration is a threat to the ECOWAS Protocol of Free
Movement of West African migrants and poses a danger to the economic survival
and security in Niger.

1.6 Structure of the research project.
This thesis is divided into seven chapters including the present one, which is the
Introduction. Chapter 2 will examine the methods used for this research. In Chapter 3,
the research will review the relevant academic literature and the theoretical framework.
The literature review provides an overview of prior research that is related to transiting
migration, while the border regime theory offers the relevant theoretical background for
the research project. Chapters 4 and 5 will cover the results of the research project.
Chapter 4 will specifically focus on the migrants’ experience at the airport, land borders,
and roadways; Chapter 5 will present the results on the situation of transiting migration
in Agadez through fieldwork. In Chapter 6, results of the research will be discussed by
summarizing the key findings and meaningfully analyze and relate them to the aims,
16

hypotheses, and question of the research. The findings will also be compared to the
postulations of the border regime theory, literature, and/or previous research evidence.
This chapter also explains the significance of the unexpected findings, limitations of the
findings, improvements that could be made to the research, suggestions, and directions
for future research. Finally, Chapter 7 provides the overall conclusion of the research
project.
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Chapter 2: Methodology and Methods.
It is important to distinguish between Methodology and Methods. Methodology is a
general orientation about how research is done, while methods are a specific research
technique used to collect and analyze data for investigating a topic (Marvasti, 2004). In
addition, methodology refers to epistemological questions and the underlying logic of
research. A key dispute in epistemology is between positivists who claim that there is an
objective world outside us as observers and constructivists, who believe that meanings
are constructed, interpreted, and constantly re-constructed by people in their
perceptions and social interactions (Castles, 2012).

2.1 Methodology:
This research project is based on the qualitative methodological approach. It relies on
the philosophical orientation of constructionism. Constructionism is built on the
speculations that our knowledge of social reality is thought to be subjective,
situationally and culturally variable, and ideologically conscious (Marvasti, 2004). As
Schwandt (2000:197) explains, constructionism suggests that as human beings, “we do
not find or discover knowledge so much as we construct or make it”.
Some factors influenced the use of the qualitative research approach in this thesis. First,
qualitative research methods are more useful and operational for the sake of the
research questions. This is most important because my interview participants were very
often undocumented, vulnerable, and difficult-to-approach migrants (Mohamed & Hein,
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2012; Red Cross, 2018). Moreover, due to the lack of appropriate official statistical
records on migration in the Sahel region, transiting migration research in Niger is better
and appropriately mirrored in a descriptive approach as offered by the qualitative
research method, rather than the quantitative method (Castles, 2012; Mohamed & Hein,
2012; Green and Thorogood, 2009:5). In addition, the qualitative method provides a way
for a detailed narrative that demonstrates the context and substance of the migrant’s
experience as indicated in the aim and objectives of my research project (Hammersley,
1992, cited in Marvasti, 2004; Patton, 1990).

2.2 Method:
This section includes data collection; data analysis; limitation and ethical issues.

2.2.1 Data collection
The findings of this thesis are based on ethnographic research. The data collection
methods comprise: desk research, participant observation, semi-structured interviews,
focus group discussions (FGDs), as well as informal conversations. The ethnographic
research, semi structured interviews and FGDs were conducted in Agadez between 25
January and 13 February 2020. The city was considered as an appropriate site for the
fieldwork because of its function as a major transiting route for migrants departing
Niger to North Africa and onto other places (See Figure 2). Indeed, one third of the
migrants that have passed through Niger have end up on a boat to Europe (Abebe,
2019). Moreover, an IOM report indicated that over 60,000 migrants transited through
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Agadez, among whom were 45,000 that traveled in the direction of Libya between
February and April 2016 (Prestianni, 2016).

Figure 2: Migration Routes from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe.

Source: Van Mapps 2006 cited in Adepoju 2008

Research participants were purposely selected through the snow-ball sampling
technique. This sampling method is essential when gaining direct access to the study
participants is difficult, except when using the referral system from a first potential
participant who recommends others (Russell, 2006). For the purpose of this research
project, Alarmphone Sahara (APS), an NGO based in Agadez, served as my gatekeeper in
reaching some of the interview participants.
In my research, I conducted nine semi-structured interviews of migrants as follows: (a) In
Agadez I interviewed seven migrants that included six Nigerians (4 females and 2 males)
and one Beninese female migrant; and (b) along the Niamey-Agadez roadway I
20

interviewed two participants that comprised a Ghanaian and Malian migrant. The
interview sessions were held in the English language, recorded, and transcribed in
English. Participants were asked questions connected to the objectives of the thesis
project. The questions asked focused on issues such as their transiting experience,
coping tactics, and ambition for transiting through Niger.
Furthermore, in Agadez, I conducted interviews with a migrants’ rights activist, a female
journalist, an ex-migrant’s transporter (driver), and two staff members of an NGO.
Unfortunately, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) rejected my interview
request (see Appendix III). In addition, I conducted focus group discussions with four
Ghanaians (2 male and 2 female) and two Nigeriens (2 males). The interviews and the
focus group discussions were conducted in the English language, recorded, and
transcribed in English.
The remaining research participants were part of the ethnographic research, which
included participant observation, group and individual discussions, casual conversations,
and interactions. These participants were border and security officers, bus drivers,
hoteliers, and two Chadian migrants. The in-depth literature review was conducted using
desk research. The reviewed materials were research papers, academic journals, books,
newspaper articles, institutions, and governmental publications.

21

2.2.2 Data Analysis
Based on the synthesis of data generated through ethnographic research, semistructured interviews, focus group discussions, the literature review and theoretical
framework (border regime theory); the main body of the thesis, particularly the result
sections, were thematically derived and developed. The themes are associated with the
aims and objectives of the thesis. The data was analyzed and appropriately coded in
accordance with open, axial, and selective coding procedures as described in the
theoretical thematic analysis (Pragna and Ria, 2011; Boyatzis, 1998).
I developed the themes by following these steps: first, I familiarized myself with my
fieldwork data by reading the transcribing interviews and field note documentation
carefully. Second, I assigned initial codes according to the content of the data. Third, I
organized the codes into themes or patterns that addressed the research questions of
the thesis. Finally, I reviewed and defined these themes based on their composition.
Analysis of each of the themes will be described in the results section by using
quotations and data generated through the interviews, ethnographic research, focus
group discussions, literature review and the theoretical framework (border regime
theory). The final analysis of the themes is in the discussion chapter. The key findings will
be analyzed and linked to the research questions, academic literature, and theoretical
framework.

22

2.3 Limitation.
The 2015 migration law in Niger made it a challenge to gain the trust of the migrants for
the purpose of interviews or discussion. This law made it a criminal offence to engage in
irregular migration or engage in activities that facilitate irregular entry, stay, and exit of
migrants in the country (Xchange, 2019a; Molenaar, 2017). Therefore, migrants transiting
through Niger were in constant fear of being arrested by the police if they were
identified. As a result, they were nervous speaking with someone they were not familiar
with and suspicious of anyone asking questions about their movement. Their lack of
trust in strangers was worsened by the presence of police informants all around the city
of Agadez. Thus, there was no secure place to hold interviews. Mohamed & Hein de
Haas (2012) agreed that it was tough to approach most migrants within Africa for
interviews due to their vulnerability as undocumented and irregular migrants.
The obstacles in reaching the migrants, as mentioned above, restricted my sample size
of Nigerian interviewees to six. However, I gained enough data for my thesis because in
addition to interviewing the six Nigerian participants, I also conducted interviews,
ethnographic research, and focus group discussions with other actors such as migrants
from other West African countries, NGO staff, a migrants’ rights activist, former migrant
transporters (drivers), a female journalist, and security and border officers. It is
appropriate to clarify that using data derived from other West African migrants is
relevant in this research project because: (1) Nigeria and other West African migrants are
covered by the same ECOWAS Protocol of Free Movement; and (2) all West African
23

migrants are subject to the same treatment by Nigerien border guards. Although it was
difficult to get access to migrants who are transiting through Niger, I managed to
conduct interviews despite these obstacles. In Agadez, I gained the trust of the six
Nigerian participants because I speak their native Yoruba language. In addition, I was
also lucky to have migrants who were transiting through Niger on board the same bus
with me from Niamey to Agadez. These migrants comprised one Ghanaian, one Malian,
and two Chadians. The long trip by road took over 20 hours (3am to 12 am). This
created an opportunity for me to gain the intimacy and trust of these migrants. I
subsequently interviewed two of the migrants (Ghanaian and Malian) and conducted
participant observation with the other two who were Chadians. Furthermore, I
conducted participant observation on the boarder and security officers along the
roadway. In addition, the refusal of my interview request by IOM denied me the chance
of making visitations to the IOM transit camp(s) in Niger.

2.4. Ethical issues
In compliance with AUC thesis conduct and regulation, I obtained the Institutional
Review Board (IRB) approval for my research project on June 27, 2019. (See: Appendix I).
Participants in the study were given the consent form to read and understand. The
signatures of the participants were secured after agreeing to the content of the Consent
Form. (See: Appendix II)
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The interviews commenced after informing the participants that their participation is
completely voluntary, and coercion will be avoided. There are no risks whatsoever to the
participants in the study. Also, participants could withdraw from the interview at any
time without giving any reason or suffering any penalty. Participants were assured of
their anonymity and confidentiality, as their identity will not be disclosed in the research
project. My supervisor will have access to the anonymous interview materials. The
anonymous interview materials will be kept for 3 years (as indicated by AUC IRB Policy)
in a locked cabinet in my office.
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Chapter 3: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
This chapter presents a review of the literature on migration in the Sahel region in order
to understand what is already known on the subject of migrants transiting through
Niger and to identify gaps in the literature. The chapter also examines the border
regime theory which provides the theoretical framework for this research project.

3.1 Literature Review
Transit migration refers to a kind of assumed impermanent or transient movement of
migrants from one country to another. The movement might cover long distances and
time. It might also be unsafe and involve constant changing of direction (Düvell, 2008).
Thus, the term transit migration is complex, dynamic, fluid, and multifaceted in scope
and theme (Castles, 2012; Pablo, 2012). It is significant to note that previous academic
research on migration through the Sahara region mostly pays attention to countries in
North Africa with less interest on transit countries in the Sahel region (Brachet, 2012).
However, in recent years, the Sahel region has become an important transit territory of
concern for researchers and policy makers. This was a result of various factors, namely:
(1) the perceived impression of the influx of migrants from the region into North African
countries with the intention of later crossing the Mediterranean sea into Europe; (2) the
EU interests in the Sahel and Maghreb regions through its border externalization
agreement and cooperation with some countries in the regions; and finally (3) the need
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to protect the right of migrants to free movement (Xchange, 2019; Akkerman, 2018; Lois,
et al 2017; Molenaar, 2017; Brachet, 2012).
This literature review will cover relevant themes that address the objectives and research
questions of the thesis. The themes covered include, among others: transiting that predates the colonial era; causes of Nigerian migrants transiting through Niger;
securitization of migration; EU migration control and border externalization policies;
ECOWAS Protocol in the context of the restrictive migration measures; economic and
political unrest versus the migration law of 2015; corrupt border guards and their
collaborators; migrants’ experience; coping strategies; feminization of migration; and
non-governmental organization interventions. The section concludes with a summary of
relevant facts from the reviewed materials. Therefore, the following section of the
literature review will focus on examining these themes.

3.1.1 Transiting migration that pre-dates the colonial era
Literature evidence shows that transit migration in the Sahel region predates the
colonial era (Molanner, 2017; Ikwuyatum, 2016; Ikwuyatum, 2012; Olsen, 2011; Adepoju
2004 ,2000; Hein de Haas, 2006; Yaro, 2007; Bakewell and de Haas, 2007). Ikwuyatum
(2012) and Yaro (2007) among others, explain that movement of people in the region
can be classified into pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial eras. In the pre-colonial
era, events such as trans-Saharan trade, pilgrimage to Mecca, and seasonal migration of
nomadic herdsmen influenced human mobility in the Sahel region. During the colonial
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era, factors such as improvement in transport services and implementation of economic
and recruitment policies encouraged migration in the period. While in the post-colonial
era, the ECOWAS Protocol, economic downturns and other socio-economic factors
enhanced human mobility. Ikwuyatum (2016, 2012), Hein de Haas (2006) and Adepoju
(2004 & 2000), explain that in these three eras, mobility of people between Nigeria and
Niger, as well as among all countries in the Sahel region, was a regular practice (NISER,
1998; UNDP and Development Prospect Group, 2005).

3.1.2 Causes of Nigerian migrants transiting through Niger
Literature further reveals that most undocumented Nigerian migrants transit through
Chad or Niger to North Africa on their journey through the Mediterranean region to the
Gulf Arab countries and Western Europe. (Adepoju, 1991 as cited in Ikwuyatum, 2016).
Previous studies indicate that various factors were responsible for the migration of
Nigerians out of Nigeria. One of the main factors was the economic crisis experienced in
the country due to the implementation of the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment
Program (SAP) in early 1990’s (Ikwuyatum, 2016, 2012). Another related factor was the
political crisis that engulfed the country due to the dictatorship regime of the military,
especially since the early 1980’s until the late 1990’s (Ikwuyatum, 2012; Adepoju 2011;
Jimi, 1997). The economic meltdown and political instability in Nigeria at the time
coincided with the ratifications of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of West
Africans by the ECOWAS states in 1980, and the pan-African policy of the Libyan
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government, which encouraged migration of Nigerians and other Sub-Saharan African
nationals into Libya in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s (Lois, et. al. 2017; Ikwuyatum,
2012; Olsen, 2011). Therefore, due to the economic decline and political crisis in Nigeria,
Nigerian migrants transited through Niger (an ECOWAS member state) to Libya or
elsewhere, taking advantage of the ECOWAS Protocol of Free Movement. Adepoju
(2011) further states that the main motivation for this type of migration is the potential
for remittances and other socio-economic opportunities accessible in foreign countries.
Other factors that caused an increase in Nigerian migration include environmental
deterioration, such as oil spillage in the Niger Delta and desert encroachment in
northern Nigeria (Adepoju, 2011 & 2004; Van Hear, 1998; Richmond, 1994). Comolli
(2017) and Ikwuyatum (2012) further note that ethno-religion crises, herder-farmer
conflict, and in recent years, Boko Haram insurgency has forced many Nigerians to
migrate (Haruna & Nuhu, 2019). This substantiates the UNHCR (2020) report that over
20,000 migrants escaped from the north-western part of Nigeria to Niger due to
violence caused by armed groups and bandits in April 2020.

3.1.3 Securitization of migration in Niger
Another central issue identified in the literature in connection to this research project is
the securitization of migration in Niger (Abebe, 2019; Krzysztof, 2018; Buzan, 1998).
According to Abebe (2019) and Krzysztof (2018), securitization of migration is the
framing of migration as a threat to a state’s security, economic stability, and national
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identity. These issues inspire states to take measures to reduce immigration by initiating
additional restrictive migration rules, which include increased surveillance,
imprisonment, and expulsion (Abebe, 2019; Rogier, 2016). In addition, some states
construct border walls and other deterrents to strictly control migration. Examples of
such border ‘walls’ include the United States with Mexico; Israel with Palestine (West
Bank); the EU with Morocco; India with Bangladesh; Bangladesh with Burma; Australia’s
sea borders; and Hungary’s razor-wire fencing (Mason, 2018; Jones, 2016).
Scholars have expressed much concern and uncertainty about the fatal repercussions of
securitized migration. For instance, Jones (2016) notes that such a migration approach
cannot discourage migrants from attempting to cross the borders, but rather, inspires
them to use extremely dangerous routes such as deserts, seas, and forests; risking their
lives in the process. The author maintains that borders promote violence and
approximately 40, 000 migrants lost their lives while trying to cross various national
borders globally between 2005 and 2014. In another study, Albahari (2015) explains that
roughly 30,000 migrants have drowned in the Mediterranean since 1990. Galtung (1969)
cited in Krzysztof (2018) emphasizes that many migrants from poor countries were
denied accessed into the labor market in the global North due to the labeling of
migrants as a security risk
In the case of Niger, the Nigerien government initiated the migration law of 2015 in
which it collaborated with the EU on the implementation of a border externalization
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policy in the country (Xchange, 2019a, 2019b). The top priority of these securitized
migration measures is to regulate mobility and reduce the number of migrants
transiting through Niger to North Africa and, afterward, to Europe (Akkerman, 2018;
Abebe, 2019). However, authors disapprove of the policy for causing more difficulties in
Niger and the Sahel region, rather than addressing the root causes of irregular
migration. For instance, Abebe (2019) explains that securitization of migration is
inappropriate in Niger because of three main reasons, namely: (1) a restrictive migration
law cannot stop irregular migration; (2) the policy worsens the security situation in
Agadez; and (3) it over emphasizes reducing the number of migrants rather than finding
solutions to the main causes of the migration. The author further discloses that Agadez
has been experiencing an increase in smuggling and insecurity since the enactment of
the migration law in 2015. Moreover, there was an increase in arms and drug trafficking,
as well as trans-national border crossing of bandits and terrorist groups in Niger and
other countries in the Sahel region since 2015 (Bruno 2019; Olukayode 2018; Comolli
2017; Molenaar 2017).
This agrees with the explanation of Molenaar (2017) that the security situation in Niger
became more aggravated due to the complicity of the state security agents (border
guard, police, and army), politicians and other actors (transporter, smugglers, etc.) in
irregular migration activities. Hence, criminal and smuggler networks continue to
intensify their activities and expand their networks in Niger (Molenaar, 2017). In
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addition, Akkerman (2018) and Xchange (2019a) agree that the policy violates the
human rights of the migrants, inhibits their development, and encourages oppression.
Literature further reveals that the EU has been the driving force behind the securitization
of migration in Niger and other countries in the Sahel and Maghreb regions. The aim of
the EU is to control mobility of sub-Saharan African migrants through the Sahara Desert
into North Africa, and, subsequently along the Mediterranean Sea into the EU zone
(Abebe, 2019; Zandonini, 2019; Akkerman, 2018; Howden and Zandonini, 2018; Lois et,
al, 2017; Molenaar, 2017; Rogier, 2016). For instance, an IOM survey specifies that
mobility of migrants from Agadez to the Libyan border declined from 298,000 to 50,000
migrants on annual basis from 2016 to 2018 (Zandonini, 2019). Abebe (2019) and
Akkerman (2018) add that the policy helped the EU actualize its short-term goal of
discouraging sub-Saharan migrants into its territory; while undermining the long-term
development, peace, and security in the Africa region.

3.1.4 EU migration control and border externalization policies
Furthermore, the EU collaborates with countries in Africa such as Niger, Morocco,
Algeria, and Libya toward preventing irregular migration, terrorism, and cross border
banditry through the Sahel and Maghreb region into the EU zone (EUCAP, 2020; EUTF,
2020; Abebe, 2019; Mason, 2018; Akkerman, 2018; Molenaar, 2017; Hertog, 2016;
Cardwell, 2011; Düvell, 2008; Collyer, 2007). The EU spearheads and achieves this
partnership through policies such as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the
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Joint Valletta Action Plan, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing the
root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (EUTF), including
operational mechanisms such as FRONTEX, and the deployment of European troops in
African countries (Abebe, 2019; Xchange, 2019a, 2019b; Akkerman, 2018; Hall, 2017).
Hertog (2016) states that the upmost priority of these policies is to address security and
irregular migration challenges. However, Abebe (2019) notes that the EU policies and
agreements on migration contributes to the increased securitization of migration in the
African region. Moreover, Howden & Zandonini (2019), Zandonini, (2018) and Molenaar
(2017) emphasize that the implementation of the EU border externalization agreements
in Niger creates economic challenges and causes expansion of smuggling and
trafficking network in the Sahel region (Abebe, 2019; Xchange, 2019a, 2019b; Akkerman,
2018)
As commented earlier, the EU partnered with Niger and other countries in Africa
towards ensuring security, migration control, and stability in the region through
different programs such as EUCAP and EUTF (EUCAP, 2020; EUTF, 2020; Xchange, 2019a;
Akkerman, 2018; Hall, 2017). For instance, EUCAP Sahel Niger, also referred to as the
European Union Capacity Building Mission in Niger, was launched in 2012 (Xchange,
2019a). It is a civilian mission and one of the 16 tasks under the EU Common Security
and Defense Policy (CSDP) focusing on international peace, stability, and security
(EUCAP, 2020). EUCAP Sahel Niger aims to support and enhance Nigerien security forces
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through training, strategic advice, and equipment (Xchange, 2019a; Akkerman, 2018).
However, its mission was expanded over the years to cover areas such as preventing
irregular migration, including smuggling and trafficking, since 2015 (EUCAP, 2020;
Xchange, 2019a). EUCAP Sahel Niger has trained 25,557 Nigeriens and provided
equipment worth EUR 4.9 million in 2018. It also collaborated with other CSDP missions
and EU agencies that include EUCAP Sahel Mali, EUBAM Libya, FRONTEX, and include
international partners such as IOM, UNHCR and UNODC (EUCAP, 2020; Akkerman,
2018).
Moreover, the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF for Africa) was launched by
European and African partners at the Valletta Summit on Migration in November 2015.
The EUTF for Africa agreement was signed by the European Commission, 25 EU Member
States, Norway, and Switzerland on 12 November 2015. It was formed to address the
root causes of irregular migration, instability, forced displacement and includes ensuring
robust migration management in Africa (EUTF, 2020; Xchange, 2019a).
EUTF for Africa is applied in twenty-six partner countries across three regions of Africa:
(1) the Sahel and Lake Chad; (2) the Horn of Africa; and (3) North Africa. These countries
are facing challenges such as high population, poverty, poor socio-economic conditions,
conflicts, and environmental crises. EUTF for Africa targets four main strategic goals,
namely: (1) greater economic and employment opportunities; (2) strengthening
resilience of communities; (3) improved migration management; and (4) improved
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governance and conflict prevention (EUTF, 2020). The approved spending of the EUTF in
the three regions is approximately €4.4 billion in 2020 (EUFT, 2020).
Niger is one of the countries in the Sahel and Lake Chad region of Africa under the
EUTF. In Niger, the EUTF focuses on four areas of intervention, such as: (1) protection of
migrants, advice, assistance on return, and reintegration; (2) the creation of economic
opportunities and professional training in transit areas to reduce the share of the
economy based on irregular migration by providing retraining to legitimate sectors and
sustainable alternatives; (3) the fight against criminal networks and human trafficking, by
delivering support to the government to reinforce the justice, security and border
management departments; and (4) support for populations which are victims of
displacement and reinforcement of institutional and community resilience in the Diffa
region. (EUTF, 2020). In 2018 and 2017, the EUTF spent EUR 253 million in Niger on 12
projects covering four areas that include: (1) improved governance and conflict
prevention; (2) improved migration management; (3) strengthening resilience; and (4)
greater economic and employment opportunity (EUTF, 2020).

3.1.5 ECOWAS Protocol in the context of restrictive migration measures
In addition, it is appropriate to emphasize that border creation and demarcation during
the colonial regimes have, until today, a significant impact on the transit and cross
border migration in the Sahel region of West Africa (MacArthur, 2019; Molenaar, 2017;
Ikwuyatum, 2012; Mahmoud, 2011; Adepoju, 2011, 2008). Ikwuyatum (2012) and
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Mahmoud (2011) note that the disregard for the people’s cultural, tribal, and ethnic
affiliations in the delineation of the colonial borders weakens the effectiveness of the
borderline. Indeed, years after colonial regime and attainment of independence, many
West African migrants perceive demarcation of borderlines as artificial. They consider
crossing international borders as moving within the same socio-cultural space, rather
than crossing two or more different countries (Olsen, 2011; Afolayan et al, 2009;
Adepoju, 2008).
MacArthur (2019) clarifies that colonial borders are porous, ill-defined and alter the
internally diverse practices of mobility and belonging among the people of sub-Saharan
Africa. Moreover, borders reshape the nomadic spatial and social relationships and
organization of the region. Adepoju (2008) verifies that colonial borders challenge free
mobility of traditional seasonal and frontier workers, like pastoralists and farmers, and
necessitates contractual agreements for non-permanent movement of contract workers
across national boundaries in the sub-Saharan countries (Adepoju 2008). Consequently,
colonial borders confront the historical pre-colonial unrestricted mobility of the people
in the Sahel region of Africa. In addition, the borderline disrupts the social and economic
life of sub-Saharan people that rely on kinship affinity and communality relationship,
rather than official boundary demarcation (MacArthur, 2019; Molenaar, 2017).
However, independent West African states have made efforts at reviving the traditional
cooperation among the people in the region through the formation of ECOWAS. To
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address the shortfalls of colonial borders and to promote regional mobility within the
Sahel region, West African states implemented the ECOWAS Protocol. As explained by
Lois et al. (2017) regional mobility in West Africa was enhanced through the regional
body called ECOWAS and its 1979 Protocol. Article 59 of the Protocol states that
‘’citizens of the community shall have the right of entry, residence and establishment
and member states undertake to recognize those rights of community citizens in their
territories in accordance with the provisions of the Protocols relating thereto.” (Lois et
al., 2017:5:3). Although, to date, only the first phase relating to the free movement of
persons has been fully implemented by all ECOWAS countries. Therefore, citizens of the
ECOWAS states in possession of valid travel documents and health certificates can enter
any ECOWAS member state visa free for up to 90 days (Lois et al., 2017). The upmost
objective of the Protocol is to recreate a borderless West Africa region with an ECOWAS
passport, prohibit stiff border procedures and dismantle security roadblocks on
international main roads to avoid interruption, harassment, and extortion (Adepoju,
2005).
Although people in the Sahel region are historically known to be highly mobile, the
ECOWAS Protocol of Free Movement further invigorates regional migration and
subsequently contributes to migration outside the region. For instance, Lois, et al. (2017)
explains that the West Africa region has the highest rate of migration in Africa with very
high intra-regional migration that accounts for 70 to 83% of total West African
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migration. In addition, 30 million West Africans have settled in another country between
1960 and 1990 (OECD/SWAC, 2006 cited in Lois, et al., 2017). Furthermore, an increase
in regional migration was recorded with more rights granted to the migrants. According
to Touré (1998) cited in Adepoju (2011), immigrant workers from Burkina Faso, Mali,
Nigeria, Liberia, Senegal, and Ghana working in the Côte d’Ivoire’s plantations
constituted 17% of the total population in 1965; 22% in 1975; 28% in 1988; and 25% in
1993. As at 1995, out of a population of 14 million in Côte d’Ivoire, 4 million were
immigrants and were granted the right to work, vote, marry the natives and own
property (Adepoju, 2011). Moreover, the Protocol provides a viable space for circular
and mixed migration of traders, workers, refugees, and displaced persons common in
the Sahel and Sub-Saharan region. It encourages intra-regional and international
mobility that has made most countries in the region serve simultaneously as territories
of origin, transit, and destination (Adepoju, 2008).
However, the current migration policies in Niger sharply oppose the ECOWAS Protocol
provision for free movement of West African migrants across the Sahel region. Two
main restrictive migration policies are identified in Niger, namely: (1) the Nigerien
government migration law of 2015. The law made it illegal for non-Nigeriens to travel
north of Agadez and, therefore, positioned Niger as the Southern border of the EU
(Xchange, 2019a; Howden & Zandonini, 2018); and (2) the border externalization and
migration control agreement between the EU and some countries in Africa, including
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Niger (Akkerman, 2018; Lois, et al., 2017). These migration policies resulted in some
shortcomings in Niger and the Sahel region. For instance, the policy frames migration
from the Sahel region to Morocco, Algeria, and Libya as a possible onward trip to
Europe and, therefore, disrupts the previous mobility patterns from the Sahel region to
North Africa or elsewhere. (Lois, et al., 2017; Walton-Roberts and Hennebry; 2014;
Brachet, 2012). In addition, the restrictive migration policy in Niger challenges the
circular migration of traders and artisans commonly practiced in the Sahel and subSaharan region of Africa (Molenaar. 2017).
It is essential to emphasize that circular migration is central to the economic survival of
the Sahel region. This is due to the continued short fallings in the agricultural sector and
the unstable economic situation in many West African countries since the 1990s.
Therefore, more people from the region were drawn into circular migration as traders
and artisans travelling across the region (Adepoju, 2008). Conservative reports show that
the majority of these cross-border migrants were traversing the Sahel and North Africa
region with no intention of crossing to Europe as shown in Figure 3 (Molenaar, 2017).
Therefore, a very small proportion of these migrants continue their mobility to Europe,
contrary to the EU claim that a large number of migrants from the Sahel and subSaharan region are attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea to Europe (Lois, et al.,
2017; Brachet, 2012).

39

Figure 3: Migrants’ origins and destinations- the Agadez-Sebha route

Source: IOM, Niamey, 2016 Cited in Molenaar, 2017.

Additionally, Nigerian, and other West African migrants encounter challenges while
transiting through Niger, despite the ECOWAS Protocol that ensures their free mobility
(Abebe, 2019; Xchange, 2019a; Red Cross, 2018; Akkerman, 2018; Molenaar, 2017;
Ikwuyatum, 2012; Adepoju, 2005). For example, Red Cross (2018) and Akkerman (2018)
emphasize that the restrictive migration policies that brand migration of sub-Saharan
Africans beyond Agadez as illegal hinderthe free mobility of these migrants. Moreover,
Lois et al. (2017) note that some West African migrants travelling in the region are
undocumented and, therefore, not able to prove their ECOWAS citizenship status, nor
enjoy the rights attached to such status. Consequently, these migrants are likely to use
smugglers’ services and are more vulnerable to pay bribes while crossing the borders
(Akkerman, 2018; Molenaar, 2017; Xchange, 2019a; Brachet, 2012).
Furthermore, the restrictive migration policies have made living situations extremely
problematic and much tougher for migrants and Nigerien citizens (Xchange, 2019a,
2019b; IOM, 2018). According to Xchange (2019a) all sorts of migrants are stuck in
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Agadez, among whom are economic migrants, migrants in transit, asylum seekers,
refugees, and migrants driven back from North Africa, including migrants from the
central and eastern regions of Africa. The conglomeration of static migrants in Niger,
predominantly in Agadez, overwhelm the already worn-out safety-nets provided by the
care giver and humanitarian organizations and puts serious pressure on the local
economy (Xchange 2019a; IOM, 2018)

3.1.6 Economic and political unrest versus the Migration law of 2015
Additionally, the poor economic situation and political unrest in Niger have made the
implementation of the migration law in the country inconsiderate to the needs of
Nigeriens. According to the World Bank (2020) report, Niger is one of the poorest
countries in the world with a very high poverty rate at 41.4%, affecting over 9.5 million
people in 2019. Moreover, according to the World Food Programme (2020), over 1.5
million Nigeriens were affected by food shortage since 2017. The food insecurity in the
country has been caused by factors such as poor agricultural yield due to climate
change, poor rainfall, and desertification, security challenges, as well as an increasing
population (World Bank 2020; Amladi, 2017; Hall, 2017; Molenaar, 2017).
It is important to mention that many Nigeriens are able to survive the poverty
challenges because of the income they make by providing services to migrants
(EuroNews, 2019; Howden & Zandonini, 2018; Molenaar, 2017). For example, migrants
in transit contributed 100 million euros ($113.8m) into the local Niger economy as
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indicated in the IOM study in 2016 (Zandonini, 2019). Indeed, on a weekly basis, a
Nigerien woman providing food service to migrants earned 35,000 CFA ($60) before
2015, while she barely earns 2000 CFA ($3.4) a week by selling peanuts since the
implementation of the migration law in 2015 (Zandonini, 2019). Barrios (2015) adds that
drivers who can transport 30 to 40 migrants in their pickup truck from Agadez to Libya
earned 4,000 euros per month before the adoption of the migration law in 2015. This
encouraged the emergence of underground networks that continue to smuggle and
traffic migrants from Niger to North Africa in more dangerous ways (Molenaar, 2017;
Xchange, 2019a, 2019b)
Similarly, the political crisis in Niger necessitated that the government reach agreements
with former rebels in transporting migrants from Niger to North Africa before the
adoption of the migration law in 2015 (Akkerman, 2018). Unfortunately, following the
ban on migration, the compensation scheme aimed at creating alternative economic
opportunity for these former rebels and smugglers has been poorly managed and
inadequate (Zandonini, 2019). Therefore, it is perfectly reasonable to suggest that the
migration law in Niger drastically diminishes Nigeriens source of livelihood, increases
the poverty rate, and creates loopholes for probable future political unrest (Xchange,
2019a, 2019b; Howden & Zandonini, 2018; Akkerman, 2018; Molenaar, 2017).
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3.1.7 Corrupt border guards and their collaborators
Furthermore, the restrictive migration policies in Niger have made migrants vulnerable
to exploitation and abuse. For instance, migrants are exposed to the manipulation and
unscrupulous behavior of the border guards, bus drivers, smugglers, and traffickers
(Xchange, 2019a; Brachet, 2012). Akkerman (2018) and Molenaar (2017) further note
that in order to avoid being caught by the law, smugglers, including bus drivers, charge
migrants higher fees so as to meet the inflated bribes demanded by the Nigerien border
guards. Moreover, Xchange (2019a) and Brachet (2012) maintain that the collaborations
of the border guards, smugglers, and bus drivers in collecting bribes from the migrants
is a common and normal practice in Niger.
The implication of this is the continuous expansion of the criminal network involved in
the smuggling of migrants, arms, and drugs (Akkerman, 2018; Molenaar, 2017). In
addition, migrants are susceptible to all sorts of harassment, such as forceful payment of
bribes, torture, rape, detention, and desertion in the Sahara Desert (Akkerman, 2018;
Brachet, 2012). The evidence in literature justifies the criticism against the practice of
tightened border control and restrictive migration policies (Adepoju 2011). Akkerman
(2018) further raises concerns over the fallout of security and border officials who have
thrived on bribes. For instance, should the flow of migration and extortion for bribes
stop, the border guards might result to other criminal ways to extort money (Akkerman,
2018).
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3.1.8 Migrants’ experience
Another important subject worth discussing in this literature review is that of the
migrants’ experience (Haggi, 2013; Blackwell, 2005; Ager, 1999). According to Haggi
(2013) and Blackwell (2005) migrants’ experiences cover every aspects of migrants’ lives
including socio-economic conditions, freedom of mobility, and health, among others.
Literature shows that restrictive migration policies in Niger significantly shape the
experience of migrants travelling through the country (Zandonini, 2019; Howden and
Zandonini, 2018; Hall, 2017). These policies expose migrants to all kinds of abuse, such
as detention, extortion for bribes, including falling into the hands of smugglers and
traffickers (Xchange, 2019a; Akkerman, 2018; Molenaar, 2017; Collyer, 2007).
It is important to note that since migrants are consistently crossing borders despite the
state’s restrictive migration policies, understanding migrants’ experiences is essential
(Tobias et al, 2018; Mainwaring, 2016; Collyer, 2012; Tsianos & Karakayali, 2010;
Papadopoulou-Kourkoula, 2008). For instance, Tobias et al. (2018) explain that
comprehending migrants’ experiences is a necessity because as states implement
policies to restrict migration through their borders, migrants are also formulating new,
trickier techniques and strategies to avoid being trapped, stopped or caught by the law.
Collyer (2012) agrees and adds that by absorbing migrants’ experiences into migration
policy and political processes, migration challenges will be better managed because
there will be proper insight into the problem. The author further explains that the gap
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between the objectives and results of migration policies will be blocked if the migrants’
experiences are considered as strategic in formulating migration policy (Collyer, 2012).

3.1.9 Coping strategies
Moreover, it should be mentioned that migrants’ experiences significantly influence their
coping strategies (Pragna and Ria, 2011). For example, migrants in transit adopt coping
strategies that are most suitable for their transient and temporary and mobile lifestyles
(Xchange, 2019a, 2019b; Lois, et, al. 2017; Brachet, 2012; Collyer, 2017).
Literature shows that migrants transiting through a territory cope with government
regulations by using smugglers’ services and bribing border guards (Zwick 2019; Mallet
and Hagen-Zanker 2018). Molenaar (2017) clarifies that migrants transiting through
Niger pay bribes to border guards and security officers in order to continue their
journeys. Brachet (2012) adds that Nigerien border guards and smugglers are
collaborators in extorting money from migrants transiting through Niger, even before
the implementation of the migration law in 2015. Moreover, Zwick (2019) and Mallet
and Hagen-Zanker (2018) identify the role played by smugglers in ensuring smooth
mobility of undocumented migrants. For example, smugglers ease migrants of
geographical, economic, and legal obstacles restricting mobility (Lois, et al., 2017).
However, it is important to highlight that smugglers expose migrants to higher risks.
Smugglers normally take extremely dangerous routes in order to avoid being caught by
the security officials, migrants are often abandoned by smugglers in the Sahara Desert,
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and migrants often lose control over their trajectories, which make differentiating
between smuggling and trafficking highly problematic (Xchange, 2019a; Akkerman,
2018; Molenaar, 2017; Lois, et al., 2017; Kamouni-Janssen, 2017; Carling, et al., 2015).
Undocumented migrants also take advantage of technology to cope with challenges
along their journey (Zwick, 2019; Mallet and Hagen-Zanker, 2018; Collyer, 2007;
Papadopoulos, et al., 2004). For example, Collyer (2007) reports that during the transSahara Desert crossing, migrants seldom lose signal on their mobile phone. This helps
them connect with their kinsmen and social networks throughout their journeys. Zwick
(2019) agrees and adds that internet availability provides opportunity for financial
transaction which helps migrants cope with their financial needs during their journeys
(Mallet and Hagen-Zanker, 2018).
On a general note, migrants and refugees commonly use religious beliefs, cultural
practices, and support from friends and organizations (including faith-based
organizations) as coping strategies. Khawaja et al. (2008) and Schweitzer et al. (2007)
note that migrants cope with unfavorable situations through the adoption of cultural
practices, religious beliefs, self-appraisal and rationalization, and by comparing their
situations with others who are less fortunate than them (Haggi, 2013). Schweitzer et al.
(2007) and Whittaker et al. (2005) report that other migrants are selective in who they
confide in and seek help from. Moreover, some migrants hardly use formal support
agencies due to their reluctance to seek support from outsiders and for the fact that
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these migrants feel that most support agencies are not always sensitive to their
situations. When these migrants do receive support from humanitarian agencies, they
are reluctant to openly disclose it (Haggi, 2013). This is in agreement with Red Cross
(2018) assertions that it is difficult to access migrants transiting through Agadez as they
increasingly go into hiding. They are reluctant in seeking humanitarian services and use
more dangerous routes. Vigneswaran (2012) further states that being elusive is a coping
tactic adopted by undocumented migrants to avoid being spotted by security officials
and hostile citizens.

3.1.10 Feminization of migration
Additionally, there is growing evidence in the literature emphasizing a rising,
independent and female migration in sub-Saharan Africa, which goes against the
previously recognized male dominant nature of migration (Ikwuyatum, 2016; Adepoju,
2004, 2008 & 2011). The causes of this change are the changing configuration,
complexity and dynamic nature of migration in the region, as well as the economic
pressure that forces females to migrate and engage in commercial activities in order to
provide for their families (Ikwuyatum, 2012). According to Adepoju (2004, 2008, 2011),
the major impact of the increasing female migrant population in the region is the
emergence of females as the main source of income and providers for their families.
However, due to the vulnerability of female migrants, literature links feminization of
migration to trafficking, smuggling, gender-based violence, forced labor and
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prostitution (Lois et al., 2017; Ikwuyatum, 2016; Adepoju, 2008). For instance, as more
females migrate, they are increasingly prone to sexual assault, trafficking and smuggling,
forced sex trade, and domestic labor (Lois et al. 2017; UNICEF, 2017; IOM, 2016).
Adepoju (2008) explains that trafficking in girls is allegedly widespread on the
Niger/Chad/Nigeria border (referred to as ‘triangle of shame’). The author further
narrates how trafficking syndicates use different tactics to lure their victims from Africa
into commercial sex trade and forced labor in Europe. UNICEF (2017) and IOM (2016)
add that due to the vulnerability of female migrants, traffickers and smugglers sexually
assault and force them into the sex trade to pay for the subsequent stage of their
journey (Lois et al., 2017).

3.1.11 Non-Government Organizations’ Interventions
Moreover, there are different non-governmental organizations working in Niger on
migration and related issues as indicated in Figure 4 (Hall, 2017). The International
Organization for Migration (IOM) is a major intergovernmental organization working in
the field of migration in collaboration with governmental, intergovernmental and nongovernmental partners (IOM, 2020). One of the strategic objectives of IOM is to ensure
the satisfactory respect for the human rights of the migrants is in accordance with
international law (IOM, 2020), However, literature reveals that the IOM office in Niger is
under constant criticism for supporting the EU and Nigerien government in enforcing
restrictive migration policies, rather than encouraging free mobility of migrants as
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recognized in international law (Xchange, 2019a; Akkerman, 2018; Howden & Zandonini,
2018; Hall, 2017; Prestianni, 2016).
Xchange (2019a) mentions that IOM is operating transit centers in Niger to temporarily
host rejected asylum seekers and migrants who find it difficult in continuing their
journeys. Therefore, the only option offered by IOM to these migrants and rejected
asylum seekers is voluntary repatriation to their countries of origin (Xchange, 2019b;
Molenaar, 2017). Howden & Zandonini (2018) and Prestianni (2016) note that IOM is a
major beneficiary of EU funding and suggests that the organization must consider and
protect the EU border externalization agenda in its operations. Evidence in the literature
shows that IOM repatriated 7,000 African migrants back to their countries of origin from
Niger in 2017; and over 2000 migrants were returned to their countries in the first three
months of 2018 (Howden & Zandonini, 2018). Consequently, the collaborations between
the EU, Nigerien government, and IOM have inspired migrants to lose confidence and
trust in IOM in supporting them in actualizing their overall goal of transit migration
(Xchange, 2019a, 2019b; Red Cross, 2018).
The Red Cross is another important international organization operating in Niger. The
aim of the organization is to support vulnerable groups of people and enhance their
resilience, among many of whom are migrants. The Red Cross in Niger underscores the
protection of migrants as they make their way across the country. According to the Red
Cross (2018), due to the lack of proper documentation and loss of social networks,
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migrants transiting through Niger are extremely vulnerable to intimidations and abuse.
Therefore, the organization has been providing medical and psychosocial services to
migrants transiting through Agadez since 2013 (Red Cross, 2018)
Figure 4: Intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations working in the field of migration in Niger

Source: Hall 2017:53

Furthermore, Alarmphone Sahara (APS) is a major non-governmental organization
operating in Niger with the concern of assisting migrants in their journeys. The APS
mission is to sensitize, document and rescue migrants travelling across Niger and Sahara
Desert territories (APS, 2020). The organization achieves its objectives by providing a
toll-free telephone line for migrants in anguished situations. Upon receiving the distress
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call from the migrants, the organization facilitates rescue teams within the area to assist
the stranded migrants. For instance, APS rescued 25 migrants travelling to Libya when
the truck they were travelling in broke down in the Tenere desert in south central Sahara
in March 2019 (MacGregor, 2019). Moreover, the organization provides migrants
necessary information about the dangers of desert trips (APS, 2020; MacGregor, 2019)
In addition, UNHCR also has a presence in Niger. The organization is providing
humanitarian supports to migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees who are forcefully
displaced from Nigeria and other countries in the Sub-Saharan region due to conflicts
(UNHCR, 2020).

3.1.12 Summary
The literature review provides information about migration in the Sahel region. The
reviewed materials help to contextualize and put into perspective the dynamics of
migration in the region and of migrants transiting through Niger. Overall, the literature
review shows that the EU border externalization agenda, the Nigerien government
migration law, and ECOWAS Protocol of Free Movement significantly influence the
experience of migrants transiting through Niger. It also demonstrates how migration
policies affect the rising feminization of migration, as well as socio-economic, security
and political stability in Niger and the Sahel region. It also reveals the involvement of
smugglers, traffickers, border guards, bus drivers, as well as migrants in border crossing.
In addition, the literature review illustrates gaps that merit further research. For instance,
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it is essential to better understand and explore the experience of migrants travelling
through Niger and the overall circumstances of their mobility in the face of restrictive
migration policies. Hence, it is obvious that conducting research on the dynamics of
Nigerian migrants transiting through Niger is desirable in order to expand the scope of
migration study in the Sahel region. In the next section, the thesis examines the
theoretical framework.

3.2 Theoretical Framework: Border Regime Theory
This research project adopts border regime theory as its theoretical framework. Border
regime theory has become an interesting topic for scholarly research and debate in
recent years (Tobias et al., 2018; Collyer, 2012; Mainwaring, 2016; Mezzadra & Brett,
2013; Nail, 2016; Tsianos & Karakayali, 2010). This theory postulates that the constant
interplay of multiple actors occurs during the crossing of a border region. It further
indicates that migration is “a conflictual field of interests, discourses, struggles,
negotiations and interdependencies on inclusion and exclusion among different actors’’
(Casas-Cortes et al., 2015; Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos, 2008; Sciortino, 2004
as cited in Tobias et al., 2018:2718:2). These actors include migrants, facilitators, private
companies, and state agents. The separate intentions of everyday actions and practices
of these different actors contributes to the dynamic and inconsistency of border regime
formation. The main intention of migrants in these circumstances is to undermine
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border control and achieve mobility by avoiding being stuck in the transit territories
(Tobias et al., 2018; Corporatewatch, 2018).
Border regime theory is relevant in my research due to the following reasons: (1) it
provides a strong framework to identify the interaction of all the actors involved in
transit migration in Niger; (2) it offers an insightful basis appropriate for analyzing my
data; and (3) it presents suitable analytical perspectives to synthesize and synchronize
my data in order to achieve my thesis objectives, answer my research questions and
argue my hypotheses; (4) it helps in analyzing mobility challenges beyond the physical
barrier of border and on the outcome of the interplay of different actors that prevent
and challenge the crossing of the border.
Border regime theory extrapolates on certain issues that are applicable in understanding
the configuration of migration. These are: (1) the non-physical function of borders; (2)
the state migration policy; and (3) the security fallouts of migration policy (MacArthur,
2019; Mezzadra & Brett 2013; Bruno, 2019; Collyer, 2012; Mainwaring, 2016; Mathew,
2005; Dina and Jasnea, 2019).

3.2.1 Non-physical border
The theory further analyzes borders not only from the geographical margins or
territorial edges, but also from the interplay of actors within and across the border
region (Nail, 2016). The interaction of these actors has become essential devices for
clearly understanding migration issues. According to Mezzadra and Brett (2013) and
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Mathew (2005), borders are complex social institutions which are marked by tensions
between practices of border reinforcement and border crossing. Therefore, isolating a
single function of a border (as providing a physical barrier) does not allow us to grasp
the flexibility and complexity of the border system and function. Nor does it facilitate an
understanding of the diffusion of practices and techniques of border control within
territorially bound spaces of citizenship and their associated labor markets. (Mezzadra &
Brett, 2013; Tsianos & Karakayali, 2010).
It is worthy to mention that various scholars in their studies and policies adopt the nonphysical concept of the border. For instance, Mathew (2005) in their study of taxi drivers
in New York City, illustrates four categories of borders, which include: (1) the linguistic
borders that divide the taxi drivers due to their multi-cultural diversity; (2) the urban
borders they routinely cross as part of their working lives; (3) the international borders
they crossed to reach New York City; and (4) the social borders that divide them from
their clients and the owners from whom they lease the cabs. Thus, this study
demonstrates how these borders configure in the composition, struggle, and
organizational forms of the labor force in that sector. Issues of territory, jurisdiction,
division of labor, governance, sovereignty, and translation were all connected into the
urban spaces that these drivers traverse (Mezzadra & Brett, 2013; Tsianos & Karakayali,
2010).
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In addition, the phrase ‘European Border Externalization’ is another example of using the
concept of border for political and ideological purposes. Although the EU border is
spatially outside Africa, it is ideologically and politically extended throughout Africa
through the adoption of the ‘European Border Externalization’ agreement with some
countries in the Sahel region.
Therefore, the border is far from serving merely to block or obstruct global passages of
people, money, or objects, but has also become a central device for its articulation.
Borders play a key role in the production of the heterogeneous time and space of
contemporary global and postcolonial capitalism (Nail, 2016; Mezzadra & Brett 2013).

3.2.2 State migration policy, migrants’ coping tactics and experience
Border regime theory provides reliable insights to understand the impact of state
immigration control measures on the experiences of migrants, as well as the
interdependencies of migrants’ tactics in border crossings (Tobias et, al., 2018). The
theory emphasizes the necessity of considering migrants’ maneuvers in the political
processes towards formulating migration policy (Mainwaring, 2016; Collyer, 2012).

3.2.3 Security and criminality
Border systems are identified with conflict and struggle, thereby making it a source of
security and criminal concerns. As MacArthur (2019) explains, the security apprehension
is overwhelming and obvious because post-colonial borders are artificial, porous, and
ambiguous. Hence, borders encourage dissidence, disorders, resistance, and contribute
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to the transnational nature of conflict dynamic (Bruno, 2019). Indeed, the high level of
violence along the borders of US-Mexico, Palestine-Israel, and Kashmir-India emphasize
the implication of border crossings and transiting on security and criminality. Through
the multifarious practices by which migrants regularly challenge borders, it becomes
clear that border struggles are all too often matters of life and death (Mezzadra & Brett,
2013).
Relating this discourse to the dynamics of Nigerian and other West African migrants
transiting through Niger, the conceptual framework of the border regime theory
provides structure and guidance that is applicable in organizing and analyzing the
findings of this thesis. For instance, the enforcement of the securitized migration policies
that include the EU migration control agreements (such as EUCAP and EUTF) with Niger
and other countries in Africa, with the aim of stemming migration into the EU zone and
the Nigerien government migration law 2015 that banned the migration of the subSaharan migrants beyond Agadez, negatively affects the migration configuration and
other socioeconomic activities in Niger and the Sahel region (Abebe,2019; Akkerman,
2018; Molenaar, 2017). The policies disrupt free mobility, especially of West African
migrants that are protected under the ECOWAS Protocol. They also affect the source of
income of individuals engaging in migration activities and cause the expansion of
smuggling and trafficking networks in Niger.
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As Tsianos & Karakayali (2010) explain, since migrants regularly cross borders despite
states’ obstructive migration policies, understanding the situation influencing the
borders permeability is a necessity. Hence, border regime theory guides the conceptual
framework of this thesis and provides structure in order to identify different categories
of actors (such as migrants, states and its agencies, facilitators, smugglers, traffickers,
etc), involved in the dynamics of transit migration in Niger. It also synthesizes the overall
picture of the findings in order to answer the research questions and argue the
hypotheses.
In this context, the Nigerian transit migrants’ motivations and decision-making
processes in the backgrounds of the ECOWAS Protocol of Free Movement, the EU
border externalization agenda, and the Nigerien government migration law 2015, will be
better analyzed and understood.

57

Chapter 4: Results I
4.1 Themes of the results
Based on the aim of the research project, theoretical framework, literature review and
empirical data derived from the fieldwork, three main themes in the results section have
been analyzed and developed. The chapter unfolds in this order: (1) participants’
background; (2) migrants’ experiences at the airport, land-border, and roadway; and (3)
the situation of transit migration in Agadez. Each of these themes are sub-topics to
accommodate the scope of the overall theme. To maintain anonymity, participants are
identified by pseudonyms and their personal backgrounds are made anonymous.
Quotations are derived from interviews, focus group discussions and ethnographic
research (participant observation and casual discussion) in order to explain the themes.

4.2 Participants’ background
This section examines the research participants’ backgrounds. It is divided into three
sub-topics: (1) participants in interviews; (2) participants in focus group discussions; and
(3) participants in ethnographic research.

4.2.1 Participants in interviews
There were six Nigerian research participants interviewed. They are identified by the
following pseudonyms: Biyi, Akin, Salome, Buba, Iyo and Mero. They consist of 4 females
and 2 males making up 66.7% and 33.3%, respectively. Moreover, interview participants
also comprised of three migrants from other West African countries. These participants
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consisted of a Ghanaian, Malian, and Beninese. They are identified by the following
fictitious names: Bismark, Ismaila, and Margret. They are all males except Margret.
Another group of interview participants consists of five non-migrants. They include the
following: a migrants’ rights activist, a female journalist, a former transporter (bus
driver), and two staff members of an NGO. They are identified by the following
pseudonyms: Jalingo, Titi, Bako, Aliyu and Mubarak. Titi was the only female among
them. Overall, there were 8 males and 6 female interview participants, accounting for
57.14%, and 42.85%, respectively.

4.2.1.1 The background characteristics of the Interview participants
The background characteristics of the interview participants are described below:
Biyi:
At the time of the interview, Biyi was a male Nigerian migrant in Agadez, Niger. I met
him in a restaurant in Agadez. He agreed to participate in the interview because I speak
his native Yoruba language in Nigeria. The interview was conducted in English. Biyi
disclosed that he was a businessman, but the Nigerian government accused him of
human trafficking and smuggling. He revealed that he was jailed for one year in Niger.
Akin
At the time of the interview, Akin was a male Nigerian migrant in Agadez, Niger. I met
him in the motor park while travelling from Agadez to Niamey. I communicated with
him in English and he willingly accepted my interview requests. Akin maintained that he
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came to transact business on cows in Agadez, but was suspected of being a migrant in
transit by the border guards along the Niamey-Agadez road. He disclosed that the
border guards extorted bribes from him.
Salome
At the time of the interview, Salome was a female Nigerian migrant stuck in Agadez,
Niger since 2019. I met her in a bar in Agadez. She agreed to participate in the interview
because I speak her native Yoruba language in Nigeria. The interview was conducted in
English. She maintained that she was presently working in a bar and hoped to transit to
Algeria or Libya by using smugglers’ services.
Buba:
At the time of the interview, Buba was a female Nigerian migrant stuck in Agadez, Niger
since 2018. I met her in a restaurant in Agadez. She granted her consent to participate in
the interview because I speak her native Yoruba language in Nigeria. The interview was
conducted in English. Buba declared that she and two other girls were smuggled from
Lagos, Nigeria to Agadez, Niger. She maintained that the smuggler promised them jobs
in Libya but brought them to Agadez. She added that the smuggler transferred them to
another person in Agadez and demanded payment of 1 million CFA from each of the
girls. She maintained that they were forced into sex trade to make the payment. She
added that she knew smugglers/traffickers that can facilitate her transit to Libya.
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Iyo
At the time of the interview, Iyo was a female Nigerian migrant in Agadez, Niger since
May 2019. I met her in a food vendor’s shop in Agadez. She agreed to participate in the
interview because I speak her native Yoruba language in Nigeria. The interview was
conducted in English. She was working as a food vendor in Agadez. She mentioned that
she was aware of some Nigerian migrants who were transiting through Agadez to North
Africa despite the restrictions. She explained that her friend facilitated her journey to
Agadez and demanded 500,000 CFA from her as the cost of bringing her to Agadez. She
added that she was not transiting because she had two kids with her she had to take
care of. She added that underage girls were trafficked from Nigeria to Agadez for sex
work until some of the traffickers were arrested by the Nigerien government in October,
2019.
Mero:
At the time of the interview, Mero was a female Nigerian migrant stuck in Agadez, Niger
since 2018. I met her in a neighborhood in Agadez through Iyo. She agreed to
participate in the interview because Iyo referred her to me. The interview was conducted
in English. She mentioned that she attempted to transit to Libya before, but returned to
Agadez because the journey was tough for her as a female due to security surveillance,
excessive heat, and abuse. She stated that some migrants at the time continued their
journey to Libya despite the difficulty involved. Mero worked in a bar and received
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support of consumable items (rice, spaghetti, cooking oil, sugar, milk) from a nongovernment organization because she said she was not going to Libya.
Bismark:
At the time of the interview, Bismark was a male Ghanaian migrant transiting through
Niger. I met him in a bus travelling from Niamey to Agadez. He agreed to be
interviewed because I gained his trust during our long road trip that lasted over 20
hours (3am to 12am). The interview was conducted in English. Bismark maintained that
he crossed the Ghanaian border to Burkina Faso then to Niger one day before the
interview. He had no international passport except a Ghanaian ID card. Nigerien border
guards extorted bribes from him in all the 15 checkpoints spread across the roadway
from Niamey to Agadez. He explained that he was transiting to Libya and this was his
second attempt; his first attempt was in 2018. He explained that he returned to Ghana
because of the crisis in Libya at the time.
Ismaila:
At the time of the interview, Ismaila was a male Malian migrant transiting through Niger.
I met him in a bus travelling from Niamey to Agadez. He accepted to be interviewed
because I gained his trust during our long road trip that lasted over 20 hours. The
interview was conducted in English. Ismaila disclosed that he crossed the Malian border
to Niger one day before I met him. He did not have an international passport, but
possessed a Malian ID card. He was extorted for bribes at the first checkpoint.
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Thereafter, he disguised himself as a Nigerien by covering his head with a veil and
putting on tiny shaped eyeglasses. This concealed his identity as a migrant in transit and
protected him from further extortion. Ismaila said his intention was to travel to Algeria.
He added that this was his third attempt to reach Algeria. He was not successful in the
previous attempts because he could not afford the fund demanded by the smugglers
and traffickers. However, he was well prepared now.
Margret
At the time of the interview, Margret was a female Beninese migrant in Niger. I met her
at the commemoration program organized by Alarmphone Sahara (APS) in Agadez on
February 6-7, 2020. The program was intended to remember the migrants who had lost
their lives while crossing the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea. She willingly
granted her consent to be interviewed. The interview was held in English. She travelled
to Niger from Benin with the intention of transiting to North Africa in 2018. She was
presently stuck in Agadez and working in a bar to survive.
Bako:
At the time of the interview, Bako was a former migrant transporter (driver) in Niger. I
met him at the Alarmphone Sahara (APS) office in Agadez. He voluntarily accepted to be
interviewed. I conducted the interview with him in English.
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Jalingo:
At the time of the interview, Jalingo was a Nigerien migrants’ rights activist. I met him at
the commemoration program organized by Alarmphone Sahara (APS) in Agadez in
February 2020. He willingly granted his consent to be interviewed. The interview was
held in English.
Titi:
At the time of the interview, Titi was a female Nigerien journalist. I met her at the
Alarmphone Sahara (APS) office in Agadez. She willingly granted her consent to be
interviewed.
Aliyu:
At the time of the interview, Aliyu was the coordinator of Alarmphone Sahara (APS) in
Agadez. He generously accepted to be interviewed and the interview was conducted in
English.
Mubarak:
At the time of the interview, Mubarak was the public relations officer of Alarmphone
Sahara (APS) in Agadez. He kindly accepted to be interviewed and the interview was
conducted in English.
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4.2.2 Participants in focus group discussions (FGDs)
A total of 6 participants partook in the FGDs. There were four Ghanaian and two
Nigerien participants. They are identified by the following pseudonyms: Kofi, Nene,
Aminu, Sabo, Juliet, and Angelica. They comprised of 4 males and 2 females, making up
66.7% and 33.3%, respectively.

4.2.2.1 The background characteristics of the FGDs participants
I contacted the FGDs participants and gained their consent for the discussions through
one of the interview participants (i.e. Bako). The discussion was conducted in English and
held in the compound of the Ghanaian participants for 58 minutes. The background
characteristics of the participants in the FGDs are described below.
Kofi:
At the time of the discussion, Kofi was a male Ghanaian migrant in Agadez. He and his
wife (Juliet) are operating a canteen in Agadez. Kofi complained that his younger
brother (Nene) was released a day ago after being detained by the Nigerien police on
the allegation of attempting to transit to Libya.
Nene:
At the time of the discussion, Nene was a male Ghanaian migrant in Agadez. He was in
Agadez to visit Kofi. He was arrested by the Nigerien border guard for attempting to
transit to Libya. He was released a day before the FGD.
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Juliet:
At the time of the discussion, Juliet was a female Ghanaian migrant in Agadez. She and
her husband (Kofi) are operating a canteen in Agadez.
Angelica:
At the time of the discussion, Angelica was a female Ghanaian migrant in Agadez. She
was working in the canteen.
Aminu:
At the time of the discussion, Aminu was a male Nigerien living in Agadez. He was a
friend of Kofi. He was working as security personnel in a bar.
Sabo
At the time of the discussion, Sabo was a male Nigerien living in Agadez. He was a
friend of Kofi and is a fruit seller.

4.2.3 Participants in ethnographic research:
Ethnographic data was derived from the remaining participants through participant
observations, casual conversations, and interactions. These participants included the
border and security officers, bus drivers, hoteliers, and two Chadian migrants. The two
Chadians are recognized by the following fictitious names: Idrisi and Gambo.

4.3 Migrants’ experience at the airport, land-border, and roadway
Understanding migrants’ experiences at the airport, land-border and roadway are
central to achieving the aim of this research project. (i.e., exploring the dynamics of
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Nigerian migrants transiting through Niger along their routes to North Africa or
elsewhere). Airport and land-borders are the entry locations into Niger and the first
points of contact for migrants. This is where the inclusion or exclusion of migrants into
the transit territory is first determined. Migrants who are denied entry at the airport or
land-border are excluded from the border, while those that are accepted into the border
region have hope of continuing their journey. It is imperative to note that most migrants
within the Sahel region cross the border by land (Xchange, 2019a, 2019b; Molenaar,
2017; Ikwuyatum, 2016; Adepoju, 2005). Moreover, Ikwuyatum (2012) notes that air
transportation in West Africa is facing many challenges, such as a lack of passengers and
cancellation of flights. In another study, Xchange, (2019b) mentioned that none of the
interviewed migrants from the Sahel and other sub-Saharan countries travelled by air to
Niamey or Agadez along their journey to North Africa.
Additionally, roadway transportation is essential for migrants transiting through Niger.
This is because transportation by road is the main mode of transportation which links
Niamey to Agadez, which is the major crossway to North Africa (Xchange, 2019a, 2019b;
Akkerman, 2018; Molenaar, 2017; Hall, 2017). Indeed, it was revealed in a study that all
the interviewed migrants from the Sahel and other sub-Saharan countries covered their
journey by road from origin to transit (Agadez) until their arrival in Libya or Algeria
(Xchange, 2019b).
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To fully explore this subject, this section is divided into three main parts: (1) Niamey
Airport experience; (2) Border crossing experience; and (3) Roadway transportation
experience.

4.3.1 Niamey Airport experience
To address this theme, I will give insights into the discussion by using my own
experience during my research trip to Niger. I believe my experience is relevant in this
circumstance because I am Nigerian and carry a Nigerian passport. I travelled by air
from Cairo and transited through Addis-Ababa to reach Niamey in Niger. My finaldestination in Niger was Agadez. Thus, I satisfied the conditions necessary to be
assumed or suspected of attempting to transit through Niger to another location.
Moreover, my expectation was that I would be granted free visa entry into Niger at the
Niamey Airport based on the ECOWAS Protocol of Free Movement for West African
citizens.
On arrival at the Niamey Airport in Niger, I presented my Nigerian international passport
and health certificate (yellow card) at the ECOWAS designated counter. Afterward, my
passport was stamped, and I was granted free visa entry into Niger. This experience
demonstrated that the ECOWAS Protocol for visa free travel for ECOWAS citizens is
enforced in Niger (Lois et al., 2017; Ikwuyatum, 2016, 2012).
After that, I filled out the mandatory arrival form. I indicated in the form that I am a
Nigerian, travelling from Cairo and my destination in Niger was Agadez. I specified that
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the purpose of my trip was to visit a friend in Agadez. Then, I was cleared to proceed to
the main hall of the airport. At the main hall, I was singled-out for a special security
check. One of the security officers directed me to a special room. There were 5 security
officers in civilian clothes in the room. Among them was a female officer.
The following conversation ensued between me and the security officer that led me into
the room:
Security Officer: ‘’We were directed to conduct a special check on you’’.
Azeez :‘’Is this the situation for every Nigerian migrant?’’.
Security Officer: ‘’It is normal for us to conduct such a check at random for newly
arrived passengers, we were suspicious for whatever reasons’’.

My two bags were properly checked by the security officers. They asked me to taste
from the menthol candy/sweetie I had in my bag. They even suggested testing my urine
for drug sampling. I was eventually allowed to go after almost one hour.
What has been less understood so far was the specific reason(s) why I was singled out
for a security check. However, this experience suggested that, first, Nigerian migrants
going to Agadez were held under suspicion of drug trafficking and/or attempting to
migrate irregularly. Second, my travelling from Cairo to Niamey, and/or desire to visit a
friend in Agadez might have inspired and influenced such a suspicious attitude. Based
on this encounter, I confirmed my hypothesis that securitization of migration is a threat
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to free mobility (Abebe, 2019; Xchange, 2019a, 2019b). It revealed that restrictive
migration laws stimulate oppressions, struggles, and conflicts between practices of
border reinforcement and border crossing (Mezzadra & Brett, 2013). For instance,
migration policies in Niger have labelled West African migrants beyond Agadez as
illegal; therefore, empowered border and security guards oppress and indiscriminately
abuse the rights of these migrants without justification (Abebe, 2019; Xchange, 2019a,
2019b; Molenaar, 2017). Similarly, the exclusion and suppression of the migrants from
border crossings triggers desperate struggles and conflicts that inspire migrants to use
the services of the smugglers and traffickers at great risk and high cost (Akkerman,
2018; Howden and Zandonini, 2018)
However, a Nigerian participant, (Akin), who also travelled by air from Lagos, Nigeria, to
Niamey Airport in Niger, had a different experience. I asked Akin about his airport
experience. He told me he had no problem at the Niamey Airport. Akin had a free entry
at the airport and was not subjected to any special security check or interrogation.
Therefore, as previously suggested, my travelling from Cairo to Niamey might have
created a suspicious mindset towards me by the border guards. The border guards
might have assumed that I could not transit from Cairo to Europe and I opted to transit
through Agadez.
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4.3.2 Border crossing experience
Over three quarters of the research participants mentioned they crossed into Niger
through overland borders. This concurs with the widely held assertion in the literature
that cross-border migration in the Sahel region frequently occurs by land (Molenaar,
2017; Ikwuyatum, 2009, 2011; Adepoju, 2008).
It is also important to emphasize that many of the research participants crossed the
border into Niger from different countries that share a border with the country (Figure
5). For instance, among the Nigerian participants were those that transited from two or
three West African countries before arriving to Niger. An excerpt from an interview with
Buba and Mero confirmed this assertion:
Azeez: How did you reach Agadez. Buba?
Buba: I first passed through Benin to Togo. From Togo, we reached Burkina Faso, then
we went onwards to Agadez.
--Azeez: How did you reached Agadez, Mero?
Mero: I left Nigeria and headed first to Benin. From there, I went to Niamey and then
onwards to Agadez.

Ghanaian Migrants (Bismark and Kofi) also mentioned that they transited from Burkina
Faso to Niger. This confirmed the claim in the literature that a country in the Sahel
region can simultaneously serve or function as an origin, transit, or destination country
for migrants (Adepoju, 2008). It also reflects the practice of free mobility of the Sahel
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people before the colonial era changed the border scheme of the region (Ikwuyatum,
2012).
There were also Nigerian transit migrants that crossed the Nigerian border directly into
Niger as shown in this excerpt:
Azeez: How did you arrive in Niger, Salome?
Salome: I went from Nigeria to Maradi and then to Agadez in Niger.
Azeez: How did you come to Agadez, Iyo?
Iyo: I went from Kano to Maradi, and then to Agadez.

Similarly, study participants from Benin (Margret) and Mali (Ismaila) mentioned they
crossed their respective countries’ borders into Niger.
This pattern of mobility reemphasizes the erratic, wandering, interwoven, intermittent,
dynamic, and complex nature of mobility in the Sahel region (Ikwuyatum 2016; Adepoju,
2008). It suggests that the practice of free mobility is part of life of the Sahel people and
thus emphasizes their view of crossing colonial borders as mobility within the same
socio-cultural space, rather than crossing demarcated territories (Afolayan et al, 2009;
Adepoju, 2008).
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Figure 5: Countries sharing borders with Niger

Source: Abebe 2019

4.3.3 Migrants’ roadway transportation experience
After arriving by air or crossing the land-border into Niamey, migrants transiting
through Niger to North Africa must travel from Niamey to Agadez (Figure 2 & Figure 6).
There are two main modes of transportation to Agadez from Niamey. The first is by air.
Based on my personal experience at the Niamey Airport, migrants transiting through
Niger are unlikely to travel by air because of the fear of being easily identified as
irregular migrants. In addition, transiting migrants in the Sahel region might be
discouraged from air travel because of the high cost; therefore, these reasons account
for the low patronage of air travel in the region (Ikwuyatum, 2012). The second mode of
transport is by road, which is commonly used by migrants transiting through Niger. For
instance, Molenaar (2017) notes that the bus companies collaborate with border guards
to ensure free mobility of irregular and transiting migrants from Niamey to Agadez.
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Hence, in this section I explore the transiting migrants’ experiences along the Niamey to
Agadez road and Agadez to Niamey roadway.

Figure 6: Origins and destinations of the principal migratory flows crossing Niger.

Source: Brachet, 2012
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4.3.3.1 Roadway transportation experience: Niamey to Agadez.
In order to observe and participate in the real-life roadway experience of migrants, I
boarded a bus leaving from Niamey and headed to Agadez. Using participant
observation and casual discussion techniques, I identified four transiting migrants on the
bus. They were one Ghanaian, one Malian and two Chadians. They were all males. I
identified them in this research project as Bismark, Ismaila, Idrisi and Gambo.
I interviewed Bismark and Ismaila because they speak a certain level of the English
language. I conducted participant observation with Idrisi and Gambo because of the
language barrier, as they speak only French.
The security officers stopped and checked our bus at 15 different checkpoints between
Niamey and Agadez. At each of the checkpoints, identification documents of all the
passengers on board were checked by the security officers. Transit migrants were
identified through such checks. At all 15 checkpoints, Bismark, Idrisi and Gambo were
asked to follow the security officers. In all cases, the driver of our bus followed the
migrants to meet and discuss with the security officers. After some minutes or an hour
of waiting in the bus, the driver and the migrants returned. Afterward, we continued our
journey. It is important to note that the Malian migrant (Ismaila) was identified by the
security guard only at the first checkpoint. Thereafter, he disguised as a Nigerien by
using a veil-like piece of white cloth to cover his head and put on tiny shaped eye
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glasses. This concealed his identity as a migrant in transit because he was not identified
again throughout the journey by the border guards.
Our bus stopped at the motor park, and I used the opportunity to conduct interviews
with Bismark and Ismaila. The following excerpts were from the interviews:
Interview with Bismark:
Azeez: Why are those security officers asking you to come down all this time?
Bismark: They are collecting money from me…they are just asking for money….money..oo.
They have collected all my money!
Azeez: Approximately how much are they collecting from you?
Bismark: I paid 15,000 CFA at the first checkpoint. At the second checkpoint I paid 5,000
CFA, and like that at every check point. They have collected all the money I have with me.
At the last check point, Bismark said he paid ‘’10,000 CFA’’
Azeez: But you said you are from Ghana?
Bismark: Yes, I am a Ghanaian.
Azeez: But you are protected by the ECOWAS Protocol for Free Movement.
Bismark: I know..I know…But I don’t have travel documents…..I don’t have a Ghanaian
passport. I only have a Ghanaian ID card.
Azeez: Why don’t you have it? It is your right as a citizen of Ghana to have it.
Bismark: I went to the Ghanaian immigration office in Ghana, but they did not give it to me.
Azeez: Okay….
Azeez: So, where are you going from Agadez?
Bismark: I am going to Libya.

Interview with Ismaila:
Azeez: But why did the security ask you to follow them at the first checkpoint?
Ismaila: You know I don’t have a passport. I only have a Malian ID so they want money and I
have to pay them.
Azeez: Like how much?
Ismaila: They say 15,000 CFA…I don’t have 15,000 CFA but I gave them 10,000 CFA.
•

Azeez: Where are you moving to from Agadez?
Ismaila: I am going to Algeria from Agadez
Azeez: Have you try to go Algeria before?
Ismaila: I tried before…this is the third time.
Azeez: What happened before?
Ismaila: I didn’t have enough money to pay smugglers at the time.

76

The above interview excerpts generate two important matters: First is the identification
issue. Bismark and Ismaila had no international passport, except for the ID cards from
their respective countries. Afterwards, I asked myself some questions, such as: do they
have international passports but keep them or hide it? Is this a new strategy adopted by
migrants transiting through Niger to present ID cards instead of international passports?
Is it to safeguard seizure of their passports? Or they are using fake names to transit
through Niger? All these questions are necessary and relevant in this circumstance.
However, I later discovered that Idrisi and Gambo had Chadian international passports
and vaccination cards. This finding corroborates literature evidence that some West
African migrants travelling across the Sahel region are not in possession of relevant
identification documents as stipulated by the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement
(Akkerman, 2018; Molenaar, 2017; Xchange, 2019a). Consequently, lack of proper
documentation exposes migrants to further exploitation and extortion by the border
guards and smugglers (Akkerman, 2018; Molenaar, 2017; Hall, 2017). Moreover, the
findings demonstrate the interplay of migrants, border guards and bus drivers in border
crossings (Tobias et al., 2018; Nail, 2016; Mezzadra & Brett, 2013; Tsianos & Karakayali,
2010).
The second issue is the bribery and corruption practices of the border and security
officers. The problem of bribery shows that transiting and/or irregular migrants who
have the resources to pay bribes will easily transit through Niger and go onwards to
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North Africa. Migrants like Bismark and Ismaila that did not have international passports
were allowed by the border officers to continue their journey after paying bribes. This
finding agrees with the literature that the collection of bribes from migrants transiting
through Niger is a common practice among the Nigerien border and security guards
(Akkerman 2018; Hall, 2017; Brachet, 2012). Thus, this practice undermines the efficacy
of the restrictive migration policies in addressing irregular migration and justifies the
claim that the EU border externalization program assists in promoting corruption in the
Sahel region (Abebe, 2019; Akkerman, 2018; Molenaar, 2017).
My personal encounter with the border guards occurred at the 15 th checkpoint, which
happened to be the last security checkpoint before Agadez. At this checkpoint, all
passengers were asked to disembark from the bus for the security check. I disembarked
from the bus and gave my passport and vaccination card (yellow card) to the security
officer for inspection. He looked at the two documents critically. He then put them into
his trousers’ back-pocket. Thereafter, I had the following conversation with the security
officer:

Azeez: Why are you pocketing my documents?
Security officer: You need to see our senior officer.
Azeez: Why?
Security officer: He will ask you questions.
Azeez: Okay….
Comment: Another security officer (probably the senior officer) asked me
about my trip?
Security officer: How did you arrive to Niger?
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Azeez: I traveled by air from Cairo to Niamey. And I have my return ticket
back to Cairo. I am protected by the ECOWAS Protocol of Free Movement in
Niger.
Security officer: My friend, you are right. But you need to pay for a permit to
enter Agadez.
Azeez: Which permit?
Security officer: It is a government permit
.
Comment: The driver of our bus was with us, he instantly intervened, and
supported the security officer.
Bus driver: It is true. The permit is compulsory for migrants entering Agadez.
Azeez: How much am I supposed to pay?
Security officer: 5,000 CFA.
Bus driver: It is true.
Azeez: What about the receipt?
Security officer: You will fill a form out in front of me and I will stamp and
sign it.
Comment: I paid the 5,000 CFA and was about to fill the form.
The security officer now changed his statement. He now said;
Security officer: I am the one that will fill and sign the form. The driver will
keep the form for later use in Agadez.
Bus driver: The security officer is right.
Comment: My travel documents were returned to me by the security officer. I
was told that I am free to go, and that I should go and join the other
passengers in the bus until they clear the other detained migrants. After 49
minutes the bus driver, Bismark, Idrisi and Gambo joined us in the bus. Then
we continued our journey. I later asked Bismark about the situation:
Azeez: How much did you paid?
Bismark: I paid 10,000 CFA.
Azeez: What about the two Chadians, how much did they pay?
Bismark: I don’t know the amount they paid because they were speaking in
the French language.
This result substantiates previous findings that bus drivers are colluding with the border
guards along Niamey-Agadez road checkpoints to collect bribes from the migrants. For
example, Molenaar (2017) mentions that bus drivers collaborate with the Nigerien
border guards to collect bribes from both documented and undocumented migrants
transiting through Niger. While the documented migrants paid 43,000 CFA, the
undocumented paid 86,000 CFA (Molenaar, 2017). This further highlights the
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postulation of the border regime theory on the interactions of different actors
surrounding border crossings (Tobias, 2012). In this situation, state agents are
represented by the Nigerien border guards and are actively involved in encouraging
irregular migration, rather than stopping it (Abebe, 2019).
In a separate interview I conducted with Margret (a Beninese participant), the issue of
bribery allegations against the Nigerien border guards was also mentioned. This is
shown in this interview excerpt:
Azeez: Your experience from Benin to Niger and to Agadez, was it very good
or very bad?
Margret: The Niger police collect bribes by force from us (migrants) after
showing them our passports and vaccination documents.
Similarly, Akin (a Nigerian participant), related his unpleasant experience on Nigerien
security guards while travelling by road from Niamey to Agadez. Excerpts from the
interview are shown below:
Azeez: Your experience while going to Agadez from Niamey, was it by bus?
Akin: The experience was not without complaint. The border guard at the last
check point to Agadez collected 10,000 CFA from me. Despite having all
travel documents, they still collected a bribe from me by force.

•
•
•
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Azeez: What is your thinking about such bribery activities of the police in
Niger?
Akin: I feel very bad. I am in constant fear and panic on Niamey-Agadez road
whenever I see those police. This is due to the way they treat migrants. And if
I am going to Agadez next time, I will go by air from Niamey.
Azeez: Please, do you have any other comments?
Akin: The only problem here is the migration stuff. Otherwise they have good
security. Our bus is moving along the desert without any security threat. I can
say someone can walk alone in this desert without any security threat. They
should maintain that. But they need to respect migrants, especially the police.

The research findings thus present overwhelming evidence to show that the collection
of bribes from migrants is a normal practice by the Nigerien border guards. The major
consequence of such a practice is that if irregular migration is eventually stopped in
Niger, the border guards who have thrived on bribes might initiate other criminal ways
to extort money (Akkerman, 2018). This underlines the fact that restricting migration
policy in Niger might work against the long-term goals of stability and development in
the country and the Sahel region (Peter Tinti as cited in Akkerman, 2018). In addition, it
suggests that a certain proportion of the huge resources spent in Niger by the EU
through EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUTF in restricting migration could have been used in
developmental programs in the country, rather than in restricting migration (Abebe,
2019; Molenaar, 2017).

4.3.3.2 Roadway transportation experience: Agadez to Niamey
After completing my fieldwork in Agadez, I boarded another bus back to Niamey. My
aim was to reassess my first trip experience and compare it to my return experience.
However, the comparison is not similar. This is because, whereas we had 15 security
checkpoints while travelling from Niamey to Agadez, we had just 1 checkpoint on the
return journey (i.e. Agadez to Niamey). At the only checkpoint, no passenger was asked
any questions by the border guards.
In summary, this chapter reveals that to travel by roadway from Niamey to Agadez is a
big task because of the numerous security checkpoints and the bribery collection
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practices of the border guards. However, the return journey to Niamey from Agadez is
free of checkpoints and extortion for bribes. Moreover, the collaboration of the border
guards and bus drivers in collecting bribes from the migrants and facilitating their
mobility will continue to undermine the restrictive migration agenda and encourage the
expansion of smuggling and trafficking networks in Niger. It further suggests the
involvement of the border guards and bus drivers in aiding irregular migration and
smuggler networks in transit regions. This finding supports the thesis hypothesis that
state migration control policy cannot eradicate transit migration because there is a
strong link between smuggling or trafficking networks and the functioning of the transit
country. It further demonstrates the struggles among different actors (border guards,
migrants, and driver) surrounding the inclusion and exclusion into the transit territory.
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Chapter 5: Results II
5.1 The situation of transit migration in Agadez
This section analyzes the situation of transit migration in Agadez. The town of Agadez is
central to this research project because it is the main route that connects Niger to North
Africa (see Figure 1). Therefore, migrants transiting through Niger must pass through
Agadez in order to reach North African countries. To fully explore this migration route
the section is sub-divided into eight sub-topics. These are: (1) terms used by transiting
migrants in Agadez; (2) motivation for the Nigerian migrants transiting through Niger;
(3) migration policy causing migrants to be stuck in transit territory; (4) economic
impacts of the migration law; (5) coping tactics of the migrants; (6) feminization of
migration in the context of vulnerability; (7) non-government organizations
interventions; and (8) securitization of migration.

5.2 Terms used by transiting migrants in Agadez.
Based on the data derived from the interviews including participant observation, I
identified terms used by migrants in Agadez to communicate amongst themselves. It is
important to describe these terms because they are mentioned during the interview
sessions. It also indicates that migrants have coined ways of sharing information,
perhaps to avoid being too open about their affairs. The terms include uptown,
downtown, connecting center, and burger.
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Migrants referred to Libya, Algeria, and other North African countries as uptown, while
Agadez is downtown. Smugglers and traffickers are called burger (e.g. Libya burger,
Agadez burger). Connecting center is a bar, restaurant or other locations or premises
where migrants, smugglers and traffickers meet, network, and socialize.

5.3 Motivation for Nigerian migrants transiting through Niger
Findings reveal that those seeking better economic opportunities under the free
mobility guaranteed by the ECOWAS Protocol is the motivating factor for Nigerian
migrants transiting through Niger to North Africa or elsewhere. The finding agrees with
previous research on the subject (Lois, et al., 2017; Ikwuyatum, 2016). Indeed, all
Nigerian research participants mentioned that they were transiting through Niger to
seek better economic opportunities outside Nigeria. This result implies that until the
root cause(s) of irregular migration are addressed, migrants will continue to challenge
the restrictive migration policies in order to cross the border region (Abebe, 2019;
Akkerman, 2018; Molenaar, 2017). Additionally, it casts doubt on the viability of the EU
border externalization program in stopping irregular migration through the Sahel region
into North Africa and later to Europe (Abebe, 2019; Zandonini, 2019; Howden and
Zandonini, 2018; Akkerman, 2018: Molenaar, 2017; Hall, 2017).
Moreover, four of the Nigerian research participants maintained that they utilized the
advantage of the free mobility to crisscross two or three West African countries before
arriving into Niger. This agrees with other studies that Nigerian migrants cross through
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the Republic of Benin and other West African countries along their journey to Niger
(Xchange, 2019a). This emphasizes the practice of free mobility commonly practiced in
the region in the precolonial era (Ikwuyatum, 2016; Adepoju, 2011; Yaro, 2007). It also
shows that some countries in the region serve as territories of origin, transit, and
destination at the same time (Adepoju, 2008).

5.4 Migration policy causing migrants to be stuck in transit territory
The 2015 migration law and the EU border externalization policy in Niger have disrupted
the past practice of unhindered mobility of transit migrants from Agadez to North
Africa. Consequently, most of the transit migrants are stuck in Agadez. This is mainly due
to the fact that they must strategize by consulting with traffickers before continuing
their journeys. In order to avoid the law, traffickers operate underground networks to
secretly traffic migrants to the North Africa region.
Nigerian migrants such as Salome, Buba and Mero expressed deep frustration and
concern over their experience in Agadez. They upheld their plan of transiting from
Agadez to Algeria or Libya. But in the meantime, they must wait and negotiate the next
level of their mobility with the smugglers. Salome and Buba expressed their mobility
plan from Agadez to Libya or Algeria as shown in this excerpt.
Salome
Azeez: Are you going to Libya or Algeria?
Salome: I have my plan to go.
Azeez: Which plan please?
Salome: I have a burger (Smugglers) waiting for me there.
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Buba
Azeez: Please if you eventually decide to go to Libya, how will you go there?
Buba: I have someone here in Agadez and another in Libya who can help in
that…
Apart from the transit migrants I met in the bus along the Niamey to Agadez road, the
remaining participants seem to be already stuck in Agadez. Due to their current
situation, the supposedly transient lifestyles identified with the migrants in transit have
been altered or changed to temporary or semi-permanent lifestyles. Over four-fifths of
the research participants claimed to be living in a rented quarter or apartment and
engage in one economic activity or the other, while still planning to transit. This finding
corroborates previous research that many migrants were stuck in Agadez due to the
migration policy in Niger (Xchange, 2019a). In addition, the situation of these migrants
contradicts the widely held perception that transit territories provide a temporary and
passing sojourn for the migrants (Hall, 2017; Brachet, 2012). Furthermore, due to their
experiences, some of the migrants who are vulnerable use the services of the smugglers
(Akkerman, 2018; Molenaar, 2017). This creates an opportunity for smugglers to operate
and charge higher fares, take dangerous routes, expose migrants to various risks, and
above all, migrants completely lose all self-control and direction of their journey
(Xchange, 2019a, 2019b; Lois et al., 2017; Molenaar, 2017). All these points play into the
interplays of different actors surrounding the inclusion and exclusion of border crossings
(Tobias et al., 2018; Collyer 2012; Mainwaring, 2016; Mezzadra & Brett, 2013; Nail, 2016;
Tsianos & Karakayali, 2010). It further emphasizes the unpleasant repercussions of the
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Nigerien government’s migration law and the EU border externalization agreements in
Niger.

5.5 Economic impacts of the migration law
The imposition of the migration law in Niger further challenges the already poor
economic situation in the country. This is worsened due to the over reliance of many
Nigeriens on the income made through providing services for transiting migrants
(Zandonini, 2019). This agrees with the explanations made by Aliyu (staff of a local NGO)
and Jalingo (a migrants’ rights activist) during an interview session. Aliyu and Jalingo
disclosed that restriction on free mobility of migrants due to the migration policies has
had detrimental effects on the socio-economic situation in Niger. For instance, based
on Aliyu’s years of work experience with a non-governmental organization that protects
the right of migrants in Niger, he maintains that the migration law in the country has
made Nigeriens poorer. He mentioned that the taxi drivers, hoteliers, the restaurant
service providers, and motorcycle riders that relied heavily in providing services to
migrants, but are now finding it difficult to survive economically due to the halt in transit
migration. Aliyu expressed dissatisfaction about the impact of the migration law on
Niger’s economy as shown in this excerpt:
Interview: Aliyu
Aliyu: Before 2015 when you came to Agadez no one would ask you for a coin
because everyone is self-sufficient. You see. But nowadays these people
who used to take care of tens or hundreds of people around them now
become some kind of, let me say without exaggerating, some kind of
beggars.
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Aliyu added that the reconciliation program organized by the Nigerien government in
collaboration with the EU to economically empower Nigeriens formerly working in
migration activities is not efficient. He expressed his view in this excerpt:
Interview: Aliyu
Aliyu: Some actors were asked to leave migration and convert their activities
to new ones. Like I was a driver and now I must not drive anymore
across the desert. Therefore, I must become a trader. Imagine at my
age! I have never been connected to trading and suddenly you say stop
driving, become a trader and I will fund you. And the funding…when I
drive, I can make for example 2 million or 3 million CFA per month or
per week and you give me 1 million and half for the whole rest of my
life to operate another activity. With the 1 million reserve for life, do
you think that it is possible to keep me from my previous activities? No.
Similarly, Jalingo who happens to be a migrants’ rights activist in Niger expressed
concerns and worries about the imposition of the migration law in the country. He noted
that the law diminishes the standard of living of the people, especially in Agadez where
the local economy thrives on migration. He revealed that after the unrest in Niger, the
Nigerien government allowed rebels to transport migrants to North Africa. But, at the
same time, the government now categorizes migration as an illegal act. Jalingo
expressed his frustration over the migration law in Niger as indicated in this excerpt:
Interview: Jalingo
Jalingo: After the rebellion in Niger, the government allowed each rebel to
have transport to build their economy and do the transport of
migrants. It is allowed. It is free to do it. But what happened? Now they
say stop. They are criminal. And they take some guys, they put them in
jail. And they take their cars, they sold them. And they said no, this is
no good, this illegal economy. But is not true. It is not true because
Agadez has been since the beginning the economy of travelers. But
what happens now? They stopped it and everybody sees that the
economy of Agadez weakens. This is a problem.
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Aliyu and Jalingo’s statements corroborate the evidence in the literature that the
migration law in Niger destabilizes the main source of income and impoverishes many
Nigeriens (Zandonini, 2019; Barrios, 2015). The continuous downfall in the Agadez local
economy encourages expansion of smuggler and trafficker networks and inspires many
Nigeriens to embark on irregular migration to North Africa in order to seek economic
opportunity (Xchange, 2019b).
In addition, Akin, a Nigerian migrant participant, maintained that his trip from Nigeria to
Agadez was for business purposes. He explained that he was appalled and discontent
about the way the Nigerien border guards perceived non-Nigeriens as potential transit
migrants to North Africa. He noted that his experience with the Nigerien border guards
might discourage his business proposal in Agadez as shown in this excerpt:
Interview: Akin
Akin: They think everyone that comes here want to move to Europe. No.
They are scaring investors away, especially businesspeople from Africa.
Akin’s declaration is a clear signal that the migration law challenges the circular
migration of traders in Niger. This suggests that, despite the provision for free mobility
of ECOWAS citizens, circular migration of West African traders is under threat in the
Sahel region. Molenaar (2017) and Adepoju (2008) warn that the disruption of the
circular migration of traders will negatively affect the economy of countries in the Sahel
region. More importantly, the Niger local economy will be at the brink of collapse
without circular migration of traders due to climate change that intensifies desert
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encroachment, drought, and famine in the country (World Bank, 2020; Akkerman, 2018;
Hall, 2017). Therefore, securitized migration measures in Niger are a threat to circular
migration that sustains the livelihoods and economic wellbeing of many Nigeriens
(Molenaar, 2017).

5.6 Coping tactics of the migrants.
In order to achieve a better understanding of this theme, findings on the migrants’
coping strategies are divided into two parts. First, the coping strategies adopted while
travelling along Niamey-Agadez road. Second, the coping strategies adopted in Agadez.

5.6.1 Coping strategies along Niamey-Agadez roadway.
My experience on board a bus along the Niamey-Agadez road shows that migrants
adopt different coping strategies to deal with border guards that enforce the state
migration law. The most commonly adopted coping strategy is the bribing of the border
guards. This is a common practice, especially among transit migrants with incomplete or
missing traveling documents. I also witnessed how Ismaila (a Malian transiting migrant)
disguised as a Nigerien migrant in order to avoid being spotted or identified by the
Nigerien border guards. Moreover, two of the transiting migrants (Bismark and Ismaila)
on board the bus claimed they did not have an international passport, but only an ID
card from their respective countries. I suggest this is a coping tactic used by these
transiting migrants to hide their identity (see section on roadway transportation
experience). All these coping strategies underscore the strenuous struggle made by
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migrants to pass through border reinforcement and avoid being trapped in the transit
territory (Mezzadra & Brett, 2013; Mathew, 2005).

5.6.2 Coping strategies in Agadez.
Transiting migrants in Agadez use various coping strategies that reflect their situations.
For instance, support from different organizations, deriving motivation from personal
religious beliefs, and becoming involved in the sex trade are coping strategies identified
among transit migrants in Agadez. For example, I witnessed a situation whereby certain
organizations came along (visited migrants in a neighborhood) and presented certain
consumable items (spaghetti, rice, cooking oil, milk, and sugar) to a Nigerian research
participant (Mero). I asked Mero about the organization as revealed in this interview
excerpt:
•

Azeez: Please, who are these people?
Mero: They first came here two weeks ago. You see all those gifts are for me
because I told them when they came that I am not going to Libya or Algeria. I
just moved into this house…so someone living in this area told them about
me, that I am a migrant. So, they came two weeks ago and advised me not to
go to North Africa. I said I am not going, so, they brought gifts for me.
•
•

Azeez: If a migrant said he is going to Libya or Algeria. What will happen?
Mero: They will not write down the name of the person and the person will
not get any support from them like these gifts they gave me. They might also
report the person to security. Last week some migrants were given 45.000
CFA each by these people. They asked me to inform them if I needed health
support or if I experienced any abuse.

Mero did not know the name of this organization. However, it is clear that the primary
agenda of the organization is to discourage transit migrants from migrating to North
Africa. This reveals one of the reasons why most migrants in transit seldom confide in
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humanitarian and non-governmental organizations. They believe these organizations
are not supportive of their migration plan; they prefer to hide and refuse to seek or
accept support from non-government organizations (Red Cross, 2018).
Another Nigerian research participant, Biyi, mentioned that he used to help the Red
Cross organization in distributing money and relief packages to migrants in transit in
Agadez. He also acknowledged that he sought emotional and prayer support from a
faith-based organization when he had problem.
Furthermore, utilizing bribes as a coping strategy is also identified in Agadez. Certainly,
the situation of the migrants has made them an easy target for police harassment and
extortion for bribes. Salome, a Nigerian participant, narrates her experience on the issue
in this excerpt:
Interview: Salome
Salome: You see at this connecting center police come to harass people. They
arrest girls and anyone they see around. This time last year they arrested
everybody, this was in December 2019. The people that had 20,000 CFA to
bail themselves out were released in the morning. Those who paid 10,000
CFA were released later in the night.
This finding supports the literature that Nigerien police officers extort migrants for
bribes due to their vulnerable situation (Molenaar, 2017; Brachet, 2012).
In addition, Bako, a former driver, mentioned that he knew some Nigerian male transit
migrants who were engaging in odd jobs such as cleaners and shop attendants to cope
financially. I could not reach this potential study group because of the security situation
in Agadez. Moreover, engaging in the sex trade is also a coping tactic used by some
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female transit migrants to survive their financial difficulties in Agadez. I will further
analyze on the sex trade in the next theme.
In general, these findings agree with other studies that migrants use various available
methods within their capacity to survive along their journey (Zwick, 2019; Mallet and
Hagen-Zanker, 2018; Collyer, 2007).

5.7 Feminization of migration in the context of vulnerability
It is worth mentioning that feminization of migration is not about comparing the figure
of female and male migrants, rather it is about the increase in independent female
migration (Ikwuyatum, 2016, 2012; Adepoju, 2011). Findings of this research project
reveal the occurrence of independent female migration in some significant ways. First,
all female migrant participants in the research project granted their consent to
participate without seeking approval from anyone. Second, despite being stuck in
transit, all the female participants mentioned they were fending for themselves without
relying on any male support. These are indications that they are independent migrants
and can take decisions on their own. The case of Iyo, a female Nigerian participant, is
remarkable in this regard. In addition to providing for herself, she was also taking care
of her two kids as shown in this excerpt:
Interview: Salome
Iyo: I have two kids with me here in Agadez. I am the only one taking care of
them.
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This finding suggests the occurrence of independent female migration in the Sahel
region. However, there is a need to conduct further research on this topic in order to
actually confirm the rise in independent female migration in the region.
However, due to the vulnerability of females on migrant routes in the Sahel, the
feminization of migration is of concern. For instance, the interview and ethnographic
data acquired for the purpose of this research project revealed some critical issues
connected to the vulnerability of female migrants. These issues are trafficking of girls,
sex trade, and forced labor. These problems are linked to the precarious situation of
these transit migrants as a result of the migration law in Niger.
It is necessary to note that the challenges of trafficking, sex trade and forced labor in the
transit territory are complex, interwoven, and interconnected. For instance, one of the
Nigerian research participants (Buba) mentioned that she and other girls were promised
in Nigeria to be smuggled to Libya. However, on their arrival in Agadez, they were
forced into prostitution. This is because the smuggler demanded 1million CFA from each
of them as a cost of smuggling them to Agadez. The excerpt from the interview
conducted with Buba revealed all these issues:
Interview: Buba
Azeez: Please can you share your experience on the difficulties you have
faced?
Buba: There was one woman in Lagos, Nigeria that informed me that she
needs someone to work in her shop in Libya. She is the one that faked
documentation for us and brought us here.
Azeez: Please how many are you?
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Buba: We are three. I later learnt when we reached here that the woman
worked in trafficking. She collected 250,000 Naira from me in Nigeria. I sold
some of the things in my shop. I thought she was telling the truth, that we are
going abroad.
Azeez: Are you the only one she collected money from?
Buba: The two other ladies when they reached here were told to will pay 1
million CFA. For me, as someone that paid some money in Nigeria before,
they told me to go pay 750,000 CFA.
Azeez: Did you pay?
Buba: Yes, we paid.
Azeez: You paid the money directly to her?
Buba: She transferred us to another person here. It is the new person we pay.

Buba’s explanation reveals the use of force on her and other girls to pay the smugglers.
Certainly, the use of force on the migrants demonstrates the conflation or blurring of
smuggling and trafficking in Agadez as widely reported in Libya (Lois et al,. 2017:9;
Kamouni-Janssen, 2017; Carling et al., 2015). In addition, the findings also support
previous research that traffickers and/or smugglers force female migrants into the sex
trade to pay for the next stage of their trip (UNICEF, 2017; IOM, 2016; Lois et al., 2017).
Moreover, findings show that trafficking in girls for commercial sex is active in Niger.
Indeed, the transfer of the girls from one trafficker to another in Agadez and the
exorbitant financial gain involved corroborates previous research that trafficking
syndicates are operating a network in the Sahel region (Adepoju, 2008). Furthermore,
the interaction of these migrants and the traffickers emphasize actors’ confrontation and
struggles over border crossings (Zandonini, 2019; Tobias, et al, 2018; Mezzadra & Brett,
2013; Barrios, 2015)
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In addition, Iyo, a female Nigerian participant, noted that underage girls were trafficked
into Agadez from Nigeria for the sex trade until recently, when the Nigerien government
arrested and jailed some of the traffickers. She expressed her opinion in this excerpt:
Interview: Iyo
Iyo: These burgers (traffickers) are bad. If you see small, small, girls they were
trafficked from Nigeria. Small, small, secondary school girls for prostitution
work, can you believe that. That is too bad!
In addition, Aliyu, (staff of a local NGO) opined that before the implementation of the
migration law in Niger, it was hard to see prostitutes in the streets of Agadez. But
presently, prostitutes from different countries are noticeable around all the streets in
Agadez, especially during the night. Aliyu maintained that the migration law disrupts
free mobility of the migrants and has resulted in immoral behaviors, such as the sex
trade and smuggling.
Findings of this theme suggest that trafficking in girls for prostitution and forced labor is
active in transit regions (i.e. Niger). It also suggests that the migration law in Niger did
not discourage trafficking in girls until recently when some of the traffickers were
convicted. The finding supports the literature that the Niger/Chad/Nigeria border was
notorious for trafficking girls (Adepoju, 2008). It also underscored the interplay of
smugglers/traffickers and migrants in border crossings (Zandonini, 2019; Tobias et al.,
2018; Barrios, 2015). Finally, it asserts that restrictive migration policies, lack of economic
opportunity and poor governance expose female migrants to further manipulation and
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mistreatment (Akkerman, 2018; Adepoju, 2008). However, there is need for more
research on this theme in order to have a clearer understanding of the situation.

5.8 Impact of the Non-Government Organizations Interventions:
Many non-governmental organizations focusing on migrants and refugees are
operating in Niger (See Figure 3). Understanding the impact and relevance of these
organizations in the country is essential. The initial aim of the research project was to
interview the staff of the Alarmphone Sahara (APS) and International Organization for
Migration (IOM); but the former accepted the interview request, while the latter rejected
it (See: Appendix III). Therefore, in this section of the research, the role of APS in Niger is
highlighted. To achieve this, an interview was conducted with two staff members of APS.
They are represented by the fictitious names Aliyu and Mubarak.
According to Aliyu and Mubarak, APS encourages migration because it is the right of
everyone to migrate. They disclosed that APS discourages embarking on dangerous
migration journeys. Aliyu maintained that APS is a network that involves African and
European partners that are saving migrants lives at sea and in the desert as indicated in
this excerpt:

•
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Interview: Aliyu
Azeez: Tell us about your organization (Alarmphone Sahara)
Aliyu: Alarmphone Sahara (APS) is a network in which we have European and
African country activists. There is a lot of death and other
circumstances occurring in the Mediterranean Sea. The Sahara Desert
is also a criminal because it can kill its victims, bury their bodies
forever, and no one will know what happened. So, this is why we try to
join our movement to the Alarmphone Mediterranean and now we
make the same group. So, they work on the sea dn we work on the

sand. That is the difference. Our role is to sensitize, document, and
rescue. We don’t discourage migrants. We don’t encourage them. They
know what their rights are.
This shows that APS’s central aim is to support migrants in exercising their right to
freedom of movement without prejudice. In addition, Aliyu and Mubarak explained that
APS was not collaborating with IOM and other INGOs in Niger. This is because APS
encourages the right to movement of migrants, while some of the INGOs, including
IOM, are supporting the state migration policy in preventing and restricting mobility.
The following excerpt further reveals their comments on the subject:
Interview: Aliyu
Aliyu: IOM is in Niger. It has its headquarter in Agadez and transit camps in
Agadez, Airlit, and Dirikue, which are parts of Agadez region. But the
problem with IOM is that they just give one possibility to the migrants.
Either they want them to return to their countries, in which they can
help them to return. Whereas for us, a person willing to go somewhere
must not be discouraged. Don’t say I will not help you in continuing
with your way forward, I just want to help you go back to your country.
You know the reason why this person has left their place. There is
climate change, there is insecurity, there is bad governance, and there
are diseases. Plenty of things that contribute to this situation of why
people have to leave their original homes for new places. According to
us you should not force someone to return to their place unless we have
alternatives for him or for them.
Interview: Mubarak
Mubarak: APS cannot collaborate with IOM and other INGOs. We encourage
free migration while IOM’s main approach is to repatriate migrants
back to their country of origin. We are against this.
Although IOM declined the interview request, the above excerpt and literature shows
that IOM’s activities in Niger are more favorable and generous towards the EU and the
Nigerien government’s restrictive migration policies (Xchange, 2019a; Akkerman, 2018;
Howden & Zandonini, 2018; Hall, 2017; Prestianni, 2016). For instance, the organization’s
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sole response of repatriating migrants back to their countries of origin is a point of
reference to substantiate this assertion (Red Cross, 2018; Barrios, 2015; Zandonini, 2019).
Therefore, the findings suggest that APS’s response to the migration crisis in Niger is
conscious of migrants’ right to freedom of movement, while IOM’s response is the
opposite.
Moreover, it is appropriate to understand the views of the migrants surrounding the
activities of these organizations. The research data shows that some migrants
misconstrue the roles of these organizations, while some are uninformed about their
operations. These create weaknesses and gaps that seem to make the impact of these
organizations less effective. To further explore this theme, the research presents the
excerpt of the interviews conducted with Biyi, a Nigerian participant and Margret, a
Beninese participant.
For example, Biyi maintained that he used to assist an INGO in distributing money and
relief packages to Nigerian migrants. He disclosed that when he was arrested by the
Nigerien security, the INGO did not intervene to assist him as revealed in the following
excerpt:
Interview: Biyi
Biyi: Those European INGOs used to come to my home to seek information
about migrants transiting through Niger and even organized the distribution
of money to Nigerian migrants. But when I had a problem they abandoned
me. I was arrested and detained by the Nigerien security forced and no one
was there to help me except my wife who stood by me with prayer. I spent one
year in detention before I was released last month.
Azeez: What might have been your offense?
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Biyi: I used to assist and help migrants, but they set me up as being involved
migrant smuggling, trafficking, and terrorism.
Biyi’s statements show the kind of expected support migrants believe INGOs and NGOs
should provide. The inability to provide such assistance makes migrants feel
disappointed, betrayed, and rejected, whereas such expected support might not be
within the objectives of the organizations. This is an indication of a wide gap between
the expectation of the migrants and the mission of these organizations.
Another gap identified is the lack of awareness about the operation of these
organizations among the migrants. For example, Margret, a female Beninese participant,
expressed her lack of knowledge about the existence of an NGO that provides support
services for transit migrants in Agadez. She voiced her remarks in this interview
quotation:
Interview: Margret
Azeez: Did you knows about the organizations working for migrants?
Margret: No! No! This is the first time I know about it.
This is an indication that some migrants are not well informed about the existence and
operation of these non-governmental organizations working in Niger. This creates a
wide gap between the migrants and the organizations. These gaps must be lessened in
order for these organizations to achieve closer relationships and ties with migrants.

5.9 Securitization of migration.
Securitization of migration empowers governments to arbitrarily label migrants as
potential threats to state security (Abebe, 2019; Buzan, 1998). This puts migrants under
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undue supervision, suspicion, and stigmatization, including the risk of constant
harassment, detention, and deportation (Abebe, 2019; Akkerman, 2018; Hall, 2017).
Indeed, empirical evidence reveals that defining migration as a security risk encourages
abuse of power by the state agents and promotes corrupt practices (Molenaar, 2017).
For instance, despite the provision of the ECOWAS Protocol of Free Movement for West
African migrants, my personal experience at the Niamey Airport and along the NiameyAgadez roadway mirrored the traumatic challenges faced by the migrants in a state that
securitizes migration. My experience reveals that migrants are vulnerable to unnecessary
security checks and extortion for bribes by the border guards.
Moreover, participants in the FGDs expressed various abuses they suffered at the hands
of Nigerien police because they were suspected of attempting to transit to North Africa.
For example, Kofi, a Ghanaian participant, explained that his brother (Nene) was recently
arrested and detained by the Nigerien police on the allegation of attempting to transit
through Agadez to Libya. He clarified that he was released a day before the FGD.
Therefore, securitization of migration is a threat to free movement of people and
exposes migrants to all sorts of abuse and intimidation. Rather than securing the
territory from insecurity, it further exposes it to more danger and crisis
The research further interviewed Aliyu, a staff member of an NGO and Jalingo, a
migrants’ rights activist, to investigate their views on the securitized migration measures
in Niger. Aliyu and Jalingo expressed their displeasure over the securitization of
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migration in Niger. For example, Aliyu maintained that securitization of migration in
Niger is unrealistic because the main source of livelihood in Agadez is through
migration activities. He believes that classifying migration as a security risk will scare
migrants away and divert Nigeriens who are engaging in migration activities into
smuggling and other illegalities in order to earn their livelihood. Aliyu expressed his
opinion as shown in these excerpts:
Interview: Aliyu
Aliyu: Agadez citizens don’t have other jobs except these migration activities.
And nowadays they think that migration is a crime. They think that we
should stop this migration. You can easily understand that there are
obstacles in this. And then if nothing is done it means there could be
insecurity problems because there are now people who graduate
without jobs. And because all these kinds of activities are conducted in
the desert you cannot excluded the possibility of bringing gangs into
the city and young people can become involved in kidnapping or
influence and make their own money from vulnerable people.
As for Jalingo, he argues that many countries of the world achieve their development
through migration. Therefore, it is wrong to label migration as a lawless activity. He
makes his remarks in this excerpt:
Interview: Jalingo
Jalingo: Immigrants built Italy. At the beginning, the movement of peoplebuilt America. The resources of the migrants build the economy of their
land. Now, if you go to Kai in Mali you will see a big town. But this big
town is built not by Malians at home but Malians in Europe and in
America. They send money to their families and their families pay for
scholarships and to build the economy. It is not true that money of
migration is illegal.
This finding demonstrates that securitization of migration hinders free mobility of the
migrants, encourages criminality, and hampers economic growth and development in
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Niger. This result supports the literature that securitization of migration in Niger
promotes expansion of trafficking and smuggling networks and exposes migrants to all
sorts of abuse and intimidation (Abebe, 2019; Xchange, 2019a, 2019b; Akkerman, 2018).
Instead of securing the territory, it further exposes it to more danger and crisis (Abebe,
2019; Akkerman, 2018). In addition, it has negative impacts on the economic
development of Niger. For example, according to Zandonini (2019), migrants in transit
contributed 100 million euros ($113.8m) into the local Niger economy as reported in an
IOM study in 2016 (Zandonini, 2019). This demonstrates that the implementation of
securitized migration measures in Niger disrupts free mobility of migrants and hampers
the economic benefits it generates (Abebe, 2019; Zandonini, 2019; Howden &
Zandonini, 2018; Molenaar, 2017). Thus, the research findings validate the hypothesis
that securitization of migration is a threat to free mobility, economic well-being, and the
security of the state.
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Chapter 6: Discussion
In this chapter, the key findings of the research project are analyzed and linked to the
research questions, hypotheses, academic literature, and theoretical framework. First,
this research project draws on the theoretical framework of the border regime theory
(Tobias et al., 2018; Mainwaring, 2016; Nail, 2016; Mezzadra & Brett, 2013; Collyer, 2012;
Tsianos & Karakayali, 2010). This theory explains the configuration of migration beyond
the physical barrier of borders and focuses more on the actions and interactions of
different actors that encourage or discourage border crossing (Dina and Jasnea. 2019;
Mezzadra & Brett, 2013; Bruno, 2019; Collyer, 2012; Mainwaring, 2016; Mathew, 2005).
These actors include migrants, the state, and its agents, e.g. the Nigerien government,
border guards, police officers, facilitators (the EU, ECOWAS), media, surveillance devices,
and others (Corporatewatch, 2018; Tobias et al., 2018; Rogier, 2016; Mezzadra & Brett,
2013). Hence, this theory provides an appropriate background that helped me identify
and understand the roles of all the actors involved in the dynamic of Nigerian migrants
transiting through Niger. This assisted me in exploring the interactions of the migrants,
border guards, bus drivers, etc., and recognized the problems confronting the migrants
in the context of the migration law in Niger.
Overall, the results reveal relevant facts that help actualize the aim and objectives of the
thesis. For example, the thesis identifies the motivations behind Nigerian migrants
transiting through Niger. They are searching for better economic opportunities and free
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mobility as recognized in previous studies (Lois et al., 2017; Ikwuyatum, 2016; Adepoju,
2011). This suggests that until the root causes of irregular migration are addressed,
people will continue to migrate and challenge the restrictive immigration policies
without minding the consequences (Abebe, 2019; Barrios, 2015; Tsianos & Karakayali,
2010).
Moreover, the huge resources spent by the EU in restricting migration from third
countries (including Niger) into the EU zone could have been better used in
developmental projects that would have promoted better economic prospects and
opportunity in these countries. For instance, the EU spent €15.3 billion outside Europe to
restrict migration into the EU zone between 2014 and 2016 (Cosgrave et al., 2016). This
fund, if well managed and closely monitored, could have been used to enhance
economic development in Niger and other third countries, thereby helping to create
economic opportunity in these countries and discourage the excessive desire to migrate.
Moreover, there is a necessity to develop robust migration agreements between African
countries and the EU that will promote legal pathways for the migrants into the EU zone
(Abebe, 2019).
In addition, the research findings show that Nigerien border guards and police officers
stationed on the check points along Niamey-Agadez roadway regularly collect bribes
from the migrants in collaboration with the bus drivers as illustrated in earlier studies
(Xchange, 2019a, 2019b; Akkerman, 2018; Molenaar, 2017; Brachet, 2012). My personal
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experience along the Niamey-Agadez road revealed that undocumented West African
migrants paid approximately 75,000 CFA, while documented migrants paid 10,000 CFA
in bribes to security officers in all the check points along the road. This suggests that
border guards and police officers are all implicated in encouraging irregular migration
and indirectly aiding smuggling and trafficking networks. Thus, this highlights the failure
of the Nigerien border guards to enforce the migration law and undermine the integrity
of the state’s immigration enforcement agency (Vigneswaran, 2012). This finding further
reveals the collusion of border guards, police officers, bus drivers, smugglers, and
migrants in border crossing. The interaction of these actors will consistently subvert the
migration policy in Niger and elsewhere (Mezzadra & Brett 2013). In this circumstance,
the border control policy cannot eradicate migrant transit activity in Niger.
Furthermore, relevant facts have been revealed to substantiate the hypothesis that the
securitization of migration is a threat to free mobility, economic well-being, and security
of the state. First, Nigerian. and other West African migrants who ought to have been
protected by the ECOWAS Protocol are being denied free mobility through Niger to
North Africa and other places. This is due to the implementations of the EU border
externalization agreement and the Nigerien government migration law of 2015 (Abebe,
2019; Xchange, 2019a, 2019b; Molenaar, 2017). The negative impact of the migration
law was extremely harsh in Agadez and migrants are in constant fear of being harassed
and arrested by security forces. Therefore, migrants are always mindful of their
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movement and frequently remain hidden to avoid being identified (Red Cross, 2019).
For instance, Nigerian participant Akin and Ghanaian participants Kofi and Nene
expressed their displeasure about how migrants are being maltreated, harassed, and
detained by the Nigerien police and border guards. Akin specifically maintained that he
was always in fear whenever he sighted Nigerien police officers. It is also important to
note that the only option offered by the IOM to transit migrants in Niger is voluntary
repatriation to their countries of origin (Akkerman, 2018; Hall, 2017). Thus, the
unfavorable situation in Niger inspires migrants to use the services of smugglers and
traffickers to evade being stuck in transit, and, consequently exposes them to further
exploitation (Howden and Zandonini, 2018). Therefore, securitization of migration in
Niger denies Nigerian and other West African migrants the right to freedom of mobility
as granted by the ECOWAS Protocol (Xchange, 2019a; Akkerman, 2018; Molenaar, 2017).
Similarly, literature shows that the Niger economy has been negatively affected due to
the diminished tourism industry caused by the kidnapping of foreign workers and the
Tuareg uprising in the late 2000s (Xchange, 2019a; Bagnetto, 2012). However, this result
demonstrates that the crackdown on migration as a result of the implementation of
securitized migration policies further destabilizes the economic well-being in Niger
(Abebe, 2019; Molenaar, 2017). First, the total collapse of migration activity in Niger
resulted in a wiping out of the main source of income for many Nigeriens, particularly in
Agadez, where many Nigeriens earned their livelihood by providing services to migrants
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in transit (Zandonini, 2019; Howden & Zandonini, 2018; Hall, 2017; Lois et al., 2017).
Findings show that the hoteliers, ghetto accommodation providers, desert guides, food
vendors, bureau de change and truck drivers lost their sources of income after the
passing of the 2015 law. For instance, Aliyu explained that the migration laws that
clampdown on transit migration through Niger badly affect the country’s economy,
especially in Agadez. Aliyu added that the reconciliation program organized by the
Nigerien government in cooperation with the EU to relieve the economic effect of the
migration law was poorly managed. Moreover, Jalingo clarified that the law makes the
people become poorer, especially in Agadez, where the local economy flourishes from
migration. These findings are comparable to previous research. For instance, a pick-up
truck driver that transported 25 migrants from Agadez to Libya earned 1,500 euros
($1,706) monthly before 2015; while those that transported 30 to 40 migrants made
4,000 euros in the same period (Zandonini, 2019; Barrios, 2015). Zandonini (2019)
furthered analyzes that a food vendor that serves migrants earned 35,000 CFA ($60)
weekly before the migration law, while she made 2,000 CFA ($3.4) by hawking peanuts
after the introduction of the law in 2015. In addition, projects such as PAIERA (the Action
Plan for Rapid Economic Impact in Agadez) implemented by the Nigerien government in
collaboration with the EU to relieve the economic impact of migration clampdown in
Agadez and provide compensation for ex smugglers ended in shambles (Zandonini,
2019; Howden & Zandonini, 2018). Therefore, securitized migration policies further
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destabilize the Niger economy, especially in Agadez where the local economy relies on
migration (Zandonini, 2019; Molenaar, 2017; Hall, 2017).
Another important point in connection to economic well-being is the interruption of the
circular migration of traders, artisans, and seasonal workers in Niger and the Sahel
region. This result reveals that the Nigerien security guards branded Nigerians and other
West African citizens as migrants in transit, thereby exposing them to scapegoating,
unwarranted interrogation, and extortion for bribes. For instance, Akin said that he was
in Niger to transact farm business with Nigerien herders without the intention of
transiting to North Africa. But the Nigerian border guards forcefully collected bribes
from him while travelling along the Niamey-Agadez road, despite having his travel
documents. Akin complained that this experience frightened him and he might look
elsewhere to buy cows. This corroborates earlier studies that securitization of migration
is a stumbling block for the free mobility of cross-border traders and seasonal workers
in the Sahel region (Molenaar, 2017). This development is detrimental to the economic
growth of Niger because the country is a landlocked country and its economic survival
depends more on the interchange of commercial and economic activities with other
countries in the region (Xchange, 2019a; Hall, 2017; Molenaar, 2017). Moreover, the
Niger economy would be in a disadvantaged position without circular migration due to
the adverse effect of climate change and the dwindling economic crisis since the Tuareg
uprising in late 2000s and the introduction of the migration law in 2015 (World Bank,
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2020; Xchange, 2019a; Hall, 2017; Lois, et, al., 2017; Molenaar, 2017). However, it is not
proper to overlook the reality that the Nigerien government also benefiting financially
and in other ways from its collaborations with the EU in border and migration control.
For instance, the EU allocated 230 million euros ($261.7m) through its Emergency Trust
Fund for Africa (EUTF) for projects in Niger since 2015 (EUTF, 2020; Zandonini, 2019). In
addition, EUCAP also supports Niger through the training of Nigerien security officers in
preventing and combating trans-border banditry, terrorism, smuggling, and trafficking,
including providing equipment worth 4.9 million Euros to the country in 2018 (EUCAP,
2020). In addition, the High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace, a Nigerien
government and EU initiative to reduce conflicts in border regions, introduced an eight
million Euro ($9.2m) project known as PAIERA to relieve the economic impact of the
migration clampdown in Agadez, as well as provide compensation for ex-smugglers
(Zandonini, 2019). Furthermore, the European Development Fund awarded $731 million
to Niger since 2014 (Howden & Zandonini, 2018). Perhaps, if these funds and other
benefits have been fairly and judiciously used for developmental projects in Niger, the
country would be in a better economic situation.
It is also worth pointing out that the securitization of migration is instrumental to the
trapped experience of migrants, especially in Agadez. Findings reveal that this situation
disrupts the transient lifestyle of the migrants and their contribution to the local
economy in Niger (Xchange, 2019a; Hall, 2017). For instance, an IOM study reveals that
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migrants in transit injected 100 million Euros ($113.8m) into the local economy in 2016
(Zandonini, 2019).
This research project further reveals that the securitization of migration is closely linked
to the security problem in Niger and the Sahel region, more broadly. Research
participants such as Aliyu and Jalingo maintained that Agadez has been experiencing
increased insecurity since the enactment of the migration law in 2015 as the law
criminalized migration beyond Agadez. Aliyu specified that many Nigeriens rely on
migration activities as their source of income and the outlawing of migration blocked
these earnings. This is because the number of incoming migrants to Niger has drastically
been reduced and the few migrants that eventually reach Agadez are always in hiding.
This forces jobless Nigerien youths into smuggling of migrants, drugs, and arms. Aliyu
added that the collaboration of the EU and Nigerien government through the
reconciliation program to empower ex-migration workers failed because of challenges
related to poor coordination and inconsistency. Therefore, the program was
unsuccessful in dissuading people from trafficking and smuggling activities. Moreover,
Jalingo noted that migration is not an illegal activity but rather a way of achieving
growth and development as has happened in the US and Italy. This hypothesis agrees
with previous research. For example, Abebe (2019) indicates that restrictive migration
policies in Niger disrupts the source of livelihood of many people and encourages
underground human smuggling and trafficking networks (Demuynck & Coleman, 2020).
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Moreover, the consolidation of peace projects organized to empower ex-migrant
workers in Niger was a failure due to corruption, poor management, and lack of funds
(Zandonini, 2019). Hence, some Nigeriens resulted to smuggling and trafficking to
survive economically (Zandonini, 2019; Howden & Zandonini, 2018; Hall, 2017;
Molenaar, 2017).
Furthermore, findings of this research reveal occurrences of independent female
migration in Niger. First, all female migrant participants in the research project granted
their consent to participate without seeking approval from anyone. Second, despite
being stuck in transit, all the female participants mentioned they were fending for
themselves without relying on any male support. These findings suggest that they are
independent migrants and can make decisions on their own. However, further research
is required to better understand if independent female migration is actually on the
increase in the Sahel region as suggested in the previous studies (Ikwuyatum, 2016,
2012; Adepoju, 2011).
Findings of this research also reveal the problem of trafficking girls for the sex trade in
transit territories. For instance, Buba disclosed that a smuggler promised her and two
other girls’ job opportunities in Libya before leaving Nigeria. But they were eventually
trafficked to Agadez and forced into the sex trade in order to pay the sum of 1 million
CFA demanded by the trafficker. Another female Nigerian participant (Iyo) mentioned
that trafficking of young girls from Nigeria to Agadez for the sex trade was rampant
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until recently when Nigerien security arrested and prosecuted some of the traffickers.
Moreover, Aliyu clarified that the sex trade in Agadez has increased since the
implementation of the migration law in 2015. However, there is need for further
research on this topic in order to have a clearer understanding of the situation.
Furthermore, interventions of international and local non-governmental organizations
are identified in Niger. For example, IOM, UNHCR, APS, and the Red Cross are operating
in the country. However, findings of the research reveal that the missions of the
international and local NGOs are in sharp contrast. The case of IOM and APS is relevant
in this context. While IOM is concerned with providing repatriation assistance to
migrants, APS encourages the right of free movement of migrants. Moreover, there is a
wide gap between migrants’ expectations and the missions of these organizations. Thus,
migrants’ beliefs about the operations and activities of these organizations are so often
misinformed and misunderstood that they find it difficult to confide in these
organizations. Consequently, many of the migrants result in self-help coping
mechanisms (Red Cross, 2018).
In general, findings of the research project acknowledge the relevance of the border
regime theory in analyzing transit migration discourse. The interplay of actors
surrounding the inclusion and exclusion in the transit or border region is on full display
in Niger (Mezzadra & Brett 2013; Tobias et al., 2012). For example, findings show the
collaboration of the EU and countries in the Maghreb and Sahel region, including Niger,
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through programs such as EUCAP and EUTF restrict migration from Africa into the EU
zone (EUCAP, 2020; EUTF, 2020; Molenaar, 2017). It further demonstrates the
collaboration of the EU and the international non-governmental organizations, such as
IOM, in actualizing a restrictive migration agenda of the EU. For instance, IOM offers
only repatriation assistance to migrants in Niger (Akkerman, 2018; Hall, 2017).
Additionally, findings reveal the collaborations of the border guards and bus drivers in
aiding the undocumented migrants to access the transit territory. This is possible
because the undocumented migrants pay the bribes demanded by the Nigerien border
guards as witnessed along Niamey-Agadez roadway. Similarly, smugglers are actively
involved in smuggling migrants from Nigeria to Agadez, and later to North Africa. In this
scenario, state agents (border and security guards) and individuals (bus drivers and
traffickers) are all involved in encouraging irregular migration and undermining
migration law. This shows the direct involvement of state agents in transit migration
activities in Niger. It also emphasizes the main reason why the imposition of the
migration law cannot stop transit migration in Niger (Abebe, 2019; Molenaar 2014;
Xchange, 2019a). This evidence validates the thesis hypotheses that the collaboration of
different actors such as the border guards, bus drivers, migrants, smugglers, traffickers,
among others, will continue to make the state border control efforts less effective. Thus,
the interaction of these actors has become an essential device for clearly understanding
migration issues and demonstrates the importance of absorbing migrants’ experiences
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into the formulation of migration policy (Tobias et al 2018; Nail, 2016; Mezzadra & Brett,
2013).
However, findings of the research project might not represent the entire context of the
migration situation in Agadez due to some reasons, namely: (1) first, the security
situation in Agadez inhibited the researcher from reaching out to other potential
participants. Probably these potential participants might offer different perspectives that
would have altered the findings. (2) Second, to fully assess and understand the transit
migration configuration in the region, a comprehensive study that will encompass a
sample size from other West African states will be required. (3) Third, the reluctance of
IOM to partake in the interview is unsatisfactory. It denied the researcher the
opportunity of incorporating the organization’s perspective into the findings. It also
made it challenging to hear and access the view of the organization on the allegation of
colluding with the EU and the Nigerien government in restricting migration. (4) Fourth, it
is very challenging to split and differentiate among stuck, transiting, economic, regular,
and irregular migrants in the Sahel region. (5) Likewise, the blurring or conflation of
smuggling and trafficking in Agadez made distinguishing between the two a challenge.
(6) Sixth, there is need for further research on the feminization of migration and female
migrants’ vulnerability in transit countries, i.e., Niger. Nevertheless, despite these
restrictions, the research project accomplished its aim of understanding the dynamics of
Nigerian migrants transiting through Niger along their journey.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion.
This thesis explores the dynamics of Nigerian migrants transiting through Niger along
their journey to North Africa and elsewhere with the border regime theory providing the
theoretical foundation for the research. This theory offers an appropriate background
that helps identify and understand the roles of all the actors involved in the Nigerian
migrants’ transit mobility through Niger. This further assists the research in exploring the
interactions of these actors that include the migrants, Nigerian government, the EU,
ECOWAS, border guards, bus drivers, non-governmental organizations, etc., and
recognizing the problems confronting the migrants in the context of the migration law
in Niger.
The results show that the motivation for Nigerian migrants transiting through Niger are
economic pressure under the free mobility offered through the ECOWAS Protocol.
However, securitized migration policies in Niger implemented through the EU border
externalization program and the Nigerien government migration law of 2015 make this
increasingly difficult. The impacts of these migration policies on free mobility, the
economy, and security have been recognized and discussed. In addition, independent
female migration has been identified and the roles of the non-governmental
organizations are highlighted in the transit territory.
Overall, the results offer strong support for the research hypotheses. For instance, the
securitization of migration in Niger due to the implementation of the Nigerien
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government’s migration law and the EU border externalization agenda drastically hinder
and limit the right of the Nigerian and other West African migrants to free mobility as
provided by the ECOWAS Protocol. It also destabilizes the economy, especially in
Agadez, and contributes to the insecurity in Niger and the Sahel region due to the
expansion of trafficking and smuggling networks. In addition, the securitized migration
policies in Niger create opportunities for border guards to extort migrants for bribes
and expose them to harassment and detention. Moreover, the roles of the nongovernmental organizations in Niger have been examined. For instance, international
organizations such as IOM offer repatriation possibility to migrants, whereas local nongovernment organization like APS encourages the right of migrants to free mobility.
Additionally, mobility of the migrants further north of Agadez to North Africa or
elsewhere is facilitated through the smuggling and trafficking networks. The networks
provide an alternative for migrants to cope with and undermine the restrictive migration
law in Niger. However, migrants use the services of the smugglers and traffickers at
higher fees and at great risk because they lose the control of their mobility. Moreover,
the involvement of trafficking and smuggling networks increases trafficking girls for sex
in the transit territory.
The findings demonstrate that the EU collaborates with Niger and other countries in the
Sahel and Maghreb regions to address the issues of trans-border security, as well as to
manage and control immigration. However, it is important to emphasize that relying on
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migration policies alone cannot address the issues of irregular or transit migration
through the Sahel region to North Africa and later towards Europe. Rather, efforts
should be made by the EU in collaboration with African countries towards addressing
the root causes of the irregular migration in the regions. The main cause of the problem
is poor governance which leads to other crises such as civil unrest, war, human rights
abuses, poverty, corruption, unemployment and lack of economic opportunity.
Therefore, the EU should encourage and facilitate better governance in its collaboration
with African countries. This will help to promote concrete socio-economic development
and deliver basic economic prospects and opportunities for the people in the region.
This will assist in genuinely discouraging and limiting irregular migration from the
regions into the EU. Thus, emphasizing the importance of understanding migrants’
experiences in formulating developmental and migration policies. Moreover, legal
pathways of sub-Saharan migrants into the EU, especially in the areas of labor,
commercial, professional and educational migration, should be encouraged between
African states and the EU.
This research lessened a significant gap caused by the under-researched area of transit
migration in the Sahel region. It revealed empirical evidence on the interplay of actors
surrounding the inclusion and exclusion of Nigerian migrants in border crossings and
transit through Niger. Moreover, the results paved the way for further research. For
instance, more research is required to understand the smugglers’ influence on migrants
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in the countries of origin to properly contextualize their operation in the transit territory.
Furthermore, issues such as trafficking of girls and women, the vulnerability of female
migrants, rising independent female migration, as well as distinguishing between
smuggling and trafficking in the Sahel region demand further research. Additionally, a
comparative analysis of West African and other sub-Saharan African migrants transiting
through Niger is also desirable.
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Appendix II

Documentation of Informed Consent for Participation in Research Study

Project Title: Niger as a transit country for Nigerian migrants.
Principal Investigator: Name: Azeez Ganiyu. Contact information:
ganiyuazeez@aucegypt.edu
01032677862 Center for Migration and Refugee Study, AUC, Research Center Building New Cairo
11835, Egypt. P.O. Box 74

*You are being asked to participate in a research study. The purpose of the research is to examine how
Nigerian migrants are using Niger as transit point in achieving their migration goal, and the findings may
be published, presented or both. The expected duration of your participation is a day or two.

The procedures of the research will be as follows: The Principal Investigator will firstly seek for the
writing consent of the interviewee after reading and understanding the content of the consent form.
After the signing of the consent form by the interviewee, then the Principle Investigator will commence
the interview. The interview will focus on questions relating to the experience of interviewee as
migrants using Niger as transit point. The questions will include, the purpose behind using Niger as
transit country; is reality in transit country meet the expectation of the migrants; what benefits, and
challenges are involved in using Niger as transit country, and related questions,

*There will be no risks or discomforts associated with this research.

*At present there will not be direct benefit to you from this research but in future the findings of the
research might help the policy makers in addressing the issue of irregular migration.

*The information provided for this research is confidential

* All inquiry about this research, the rights of the participant and other related issues should be directed
to Azeez Ganiyu at +201032677862
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*Participation in this study is voluntary. Refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits
to which you are otherwise entitled. You may discontinue participation at any time without penalty or
the loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.

Signature

Printed Name

________________________________________

Date

_______________________________________

Appendix III
Appendix III: IOM interview declined email.

MEWISSEN Celine

Mon, Feb 10,
11:22 AM

to me, CHIRIAC
Dear Azeez,
Thank you very much for these additional information. Unfortunately, we will not be able to support you
further. We receive many requests to visit the transit centers and we can't answer them all. Indeed, we
must protect the well-being, tranquility and privacy of the migrants who reside there as well as possible.
However, we wish you good luck and much success with your research.
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